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ABSTRACT 
Transnational crime, violent extremism, insecurity, and instability are common 
challenges that negatively impact U.S. interests in Africa, including democracy 
promotion, development, trade, peace, and security. Professional African militaries are 
one potential solution to these challenges. Toward this end, U.S. military training and 
professional education has increased in Africa since 2002. Building professional 
militaries can improve security but also presents a moral dilemma. African regimes are 
often criticized for poor governance—including patrimonial, kleptocratic, and 
authoritarian rule—and African armies are often political in nature. In this regard, this 
thesis investigated whether U.S. training and professional education encourages 
democratic civil-military relations or simply provides rulers with more lethal militaries. 
From a comparison of four case studies, the effects of U.S. security assistance to El 
Salvador and Colombia during the 1980s and 1990s were compared to the political and 
military environments of modern Cameroon and Senegal to determine potential outcomes 
of current and future training and professional education programs there. Results show 
likely increases in soldiering skills but indeterminate effects on the professionalism 
required for transition to democratic civil-military relations. This transition is more 
probable when both the partner state’s regime and military are reform-minded, and 
reforms are implemented throughout the defense sector. 
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A.  BACKGROUND 
In November 2010, Cote d’Ivoire President Laurent Gbagbo lost re-election in what 
was considered a “relatively free and fair” democratic process.1 The military disregarded 
its duty to support the constitution, came out of its barracks, helped Gbagbo flee 
international authorities, and attacked his opponents in an attempt to overturn the election 
results.2 Thousands died between the announcement of Gbagbo’s electoral loss and his 
arrest in April 2011. The military had been a critical client in Gbagbo’s patrimonial 
network during his ten-year rule and this likely prompted them to back him instead of 
observing the rule of law.  
The Cote d’Ivoire case is a good example of undemocratic civil-military relations. 
Regrettably, the Cote d’Ivoire case is not unique in Africa. State use of militaries and 
security forces to repress political activities and other civil liberties occurs frequently in 
African states such as Cameroon and Zimbabwe. African militaries also attempt coups, as 
they did in Niger in 2010, Burkina Faso in 2014, and Burundi in 2015.3 It is likely that 
better-trained, professional militaries, which accept the civilian supremacy of the armed 
forces, would improve contemporary African civil-military relations (understood as a 
trinity of civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency), which will ultimately result in 
better governance, improved legitimacy, political liberalization, and limit the misuse or 
misbehavior of African armed forces.4 Unfortunately, it is also possible that militaries in 
                                                 
1 “Freedom in the World 2011: Cote d’Ivoire Report,” Freedom House. 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/c-te-divoire. Viewed 31 August 2017. 
2 Mathurin C. Houngnikpo, “Africa’s Militaries: A Missing Link in Democratic Transitions,” Africa 
Security Brief, No.17 (January 2012), 4. 
3 Jonathan Powell, Trace Lasley and Rebecca Shiel, “Combating Coups d’Etats in Africa 1950–2014,” 
Studies in Comparative International Development 51, No. 4 (2016), 500. 
4 Florina Cristiana Matei, “A new conceptualization of civil-military relations,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 35. 
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Africa will continue to impair democracy and governance since civilian authority over the 
military “remains a missing piece of Africa’s democratic transition puzzle.”5  
This thesis researches the current roles militaries perform in African politics and 
their relationship with the requirements for democratic civil-military relations.6 
Specifically, it addresses how externally trained and educated militaries influence the 
democratization of civil-military relations in Africa. It also analyzes whether or not military 
professionalism alone is sufficient to ensure the armed forces’ political neutrality and 
further democratization of civil-military relations in Africa. 
The overall purpose of this investigation is to gain a better understanding for how 
the U.S. Department of Defense foreign military training and professional education 
programs could improve or impair the democratization of civil-military relations in 
transitioning democracies and illiberal democracies in Africa. Military training and 
professional education programs improve a military’s lethality, efficiency, and 
effectiveness, and are intended to modify behaviors and improve decision making in 
scenarios encountered across the range of military operations. These programs are crucial 
in regions like Africa where the DoD seeks to gain partners to achieve strategic objectives 
such as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.  
This investigation is relevant to the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa 
(MARFORAFRICOM). The genesis of this particular research lies in the 
MARFORAFRICOM Commander’s desire to develop a professional noncommissioned 
officer (NCO) corps in both Senegal and Cameroon. The intent of these programs is “to 
increase familiarity of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) amongst like-minded 
forces on the continent.”7 The program’s concept is based on a Commander, U.S. Marine 
                                                 
5 Houngnikpo, “Africa’s Militaries: A Missing Link in Democratic Transitions,” 3.  
6 The model of democratic civil–military relations used in this thesis is the model presented by 
Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei in The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations. 
This model consists of democratic civilian control and measures the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
security institutions. This thesis will use a minimalist definition of democracy, describing states that hold 
national elections as democratic. This will facilitate the analysis of Cameroon.  
7 Major General Niel E. Nelson, quoted in an email from Major Temitope Songonuga, U.S. Marine 
Corps, dated 25 May 2017. 
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Corps Forces, Europe, model currently implemented with partnering amphibious forces. 
The Commander, MARFORAFRICOM, wants to determine if a similar effort is worth 
pursuing with African partner states and to what extent. A successfully implemented 
program would likely be expanded to other countries that have the political will to develop 
their NCO corps. Other DoD service and functional components have similar programs 
currently in operation or planning stages. 
The training and professional education of African militaries may simply be an 
attempt by the DoD to use African troops to subsidize U.S. strategic lines of effort. As the 
DoD budget is more constrained and the threat of violent extremist organizations grows in 
Africa, improving African militaries’ capacities to address these threats can relieve the 
burden on the U.S. soldier and potentially the U.S. taxpayer. However, training African 
militaries could have different effects on civil-military relations depending on the regime 
type. Professionalized militaries in consolidating democracies like Senegal are more likely 
to submit to increased civilian control, observe the rule of law, play a minimal role in 
politics, and become a symbol of national pride. Will professionalized militaries in illiberal 
democracies like Cameroon seek the same?8 That is the hope.  
Just as they may be a boon, professionalized militaries may also turn out to be a 
bane. The fear is Paul Biya, Cameroon’s president since 1982, could instead get a U.S.-
trained security force that is more effective at being used for repression and political 
policing. In this scenario, rather than reforming, the military would continue to be used by 
political elites for extrajudicial detention and torture of Cameroonians suspected of having 
ties to Boko Haram, the opposition party, or the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
community.9 Another fear is a U.S.-trained military fails to de-politicize and uses its 
improved lethality, tactical and operational efficiency to return an electorally deposed 
leader to power in the vein of the 2010 incident in Cote d’Ivoire. Of course, there is also 
the possibility that a professional army will step into politics in a state that is democratically 
                                                 
8 “Freedom in the World 2017,” Freedom House, data pull on 9 May 2017. www. 
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017. 
9 Alioune Tine, Cameroon’s Secret Torture Chambers: Human Rights Violations and War Crimes in 
the Fight against Boko Haram, (London: Amnesty International Ltd, 2017), 6. 
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regressing and change the government with the consent of the people.10 Professionalizing 
militaries in African states is not a one size fits all proposition and presents the DoD with 
a moral dilemma.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Civil-military relations are “the relations of the armed forces, the state, and the rest 
of society.”11 The fundamental aspects of civil-military relations are these: the military’s 
formal structure within the government; the military’s formal and informal roles and their 
influence on politics and society; and the compatibility of the “nature of ideologies of 
military and non-military groups.”12 This review surveys a cross-section of scholarly 
literature to parse these concepts and discern potential effects of externally driven military 
training and professional education programs on civil-military affairs. The literature review 
identifies the framework for examining the research question based in the trinity of 
democratic civil-military relations: control, effectiveness, and efficiency.  
1. The Military as a Profession 
In order to understand military professionalism as a variable of democratic civil 
military relations, professionalism should be divided into two models. The first —referred 
to here as the soldier-state model— is a social science concept of military professionalism 
that evolves from Samuel P. Huntington and focuses on the military’s relationship and 
responsibilities to the state. The second —referred to here as the soldiering skills model— 
is a military science concept that focuses on the soldier’s relationship to the military 
profession. Both are important measures of determining military professionalism and are 
of the same genesis, but may not be equally related in their impacts on civil-military 
relations.  
                                                 
10 Powell et al., 500. 
11 Narcis Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces, translated by Peter 
Bush, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79. 
12 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1972), VIII. 
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Huntington describes a profession as having “expertise, responsibility, and 
corporateness.”13 Expertise is achieved through education and experience. Responsibility 
is the belief in achieving expertise and exercising it when required by society. 
Corporateness encompasses an understanding that the organization is bigger than the self, 
and accomplishing the organization’s roles and missions supersedes one’s personal agenda. 
Huntington claims the military is a “peculiar type of functional group with highly 
specialized characteristics.”14 The “management of violence” is the critical skill that 
separates the military officer from the rest of society, and the officer must direct, operate, 
plan for, and control his organization in the application of violence.15 Harold Lasswell 
agrees with the critical skill of being “specialists on violence,” as does Morris Janowitz in 
saying professional officers are charged with “directing the application of violence under 
certain prescribed conditions.”16  
The key characteristic of the solder-state model is derived from Huntington’s 
argument the soldier has a social responsibility to be an expert who practices his profession 
for the benefit of society, obligated by oaths or statements of societal relation, and 
functioning under high ethical standards.17 The professional soldier executes his roles and 
missions because it is expected of him and he is the only one who can. Huntington claims 
military officers are professional only if they are loyal to the military ideals—their duty to 
serve and protect the state- and a “loyalty to the idea of professional competence,” duties 
he believed were permanent.18  
Thomas Bruneau and others disagree with Huntington’s idea that military 
professionalism is static in its reliance on loyalty to military ideals.19 While “social 
                                                 
13 Huntington, 8–10. 
14 Huntington, 7. 
15 Huntington, 11. 
16 Timothy Edmunds, “What Are Armed Forces For? The Changing Nature of Military Roles in 
Europe,” International Affairs 82, No. 6 (Nov. 2006), 1060. 
17 Huntington, 9–10. 
18 Huntington, 74. 
19 Bruneau, “Impediments to the accurate conceptualization of civil-military relations,” in The 
Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, 
(New York: Routledge, 2013), 16–17. 
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responsibility, corporateness, and honor-related pride to serve one’s nation” are important, 
the soldier-state model is fluid.20 Jose A. Olmeda says Huntington fails to acknowledge 
that the ethos of public service, skill structure, and internal cohesion is part of military 
professionalism.21 Serra argues the military must be willing to change with government 
and societal changes, and that military values do not have to be, and perhaps should not be, 
completely isolated and external to societal values.22 Militaries that hold permanent values 
dear are susceptible to associating military values as higher than societal values and 
becoming the guardians of those higher values. Serra continues the military must share 
values and principles that are part of the democratic process and those held by civil-society: 
de-politicizing the military, protecting human rights, and religious tolerance.23 Donald 
Abenheim suggests the rule of law and civil-society norms must inform military behavior, 
training, and operations.24 Because Huntington identifies the state and its citizens as the 
client of the military, Shemella suggests the armed forces should help build “a sense of 
national identity” and should be more connected to the citizen, instead of isolated as 
Huntington suggests.25 Finally, while citizens and the military both need to understand the 
military is not the nation, Ronald Krebs believes the military should demonstrate the 
character of the nation.26 
The soldiering skills model is professionalism defined by mastering the art and 
science of war —warfighting—technical expertise, and general military conduct.27 The 
soldiering skills model, like the soldier-state model, shares a Huntingtonian genesis, but it 
                                                 
20 Joseph Soeterss and Audrey Van Ouytsel, “The Challenge of Diffusing Military Professionalism in 
Africa,” Armed Forces & Society 40, No. 2 (2014), 254. 
21 Olmeda, 63. 
22 Serra, 54, 57–58. 
23 Serra, 75. 
24 Donald Abenheim, Soldier and Politics Transformed: German-American Reflections on Civil-
Military Relations in a New Strategic Environment, (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles, 2007) 192. 
25 Paul Shemella, “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,” in Who Guards the 
Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, 
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006), 128. 
26 Ronald R. Krebs, Fighting For Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2006), 10. 
27 Soeters and Van Auytsel, 254. 
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can exist without the soldier-state model. It is in the soldiering skills that militaries remain 
isolated from society. This is an important distinction in this thesis considering DoD-led 
training curriculum focus considerably more on soldiering skills.  
S.E. Finer states that militaries are hierarchical and highly stratified, with clearly 
defined relationships of subordination and separation between grades and ranks.28 This 
structure depersonalizes authority and places it squarely with the rank and not the 
individual. Where Huntington says the role of the officer is a profession and the role of 
enlisted is a vocation, Kenneth Estes disagrees saying the modern military is considered a 
profession of arms wherein both officer and enlisted perform roles in making their units 
effective and prepared to perform roles and missions.29 Continuous professional military 
education, training, and certification are critical in maintaining a high proficiency in 
soldiering skills. The profession of arms creates a moral and ethical imperative in the 
soldier to “focus on generating expert knowledge and the ability... to apply that expertise 
to new situations,” just as a doctor or lawyer would, according to Don Snider.30  
Excellence in the soldiering skills model facilitates accomplishment of the 
military’s roles and missions. Shemella defines roles as having a general and long-term 
purpose, while missions are specific tasks shaped by time-sensitive events requiring a 
military response.31 Both roles and missions inform how armed forces are structured, 
equipped, and trained; the responsibilities of the professional soldier. Today’s military 
missions encompass more than just national security, and conventional war may be least 
likely of six military functions to be performed today according to Matei.32 Militaries 
perform at least six primary roles and they are wars, internal wars, terrorism, crime, 
humanitarian assistance, and peace operations. Edmunds points out that militaries have 
                                                 
28 S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, (London: Pall Mall Press 
Limited, 1962), 7. 
29 Kenneth W. Estes, Handbook for Marine NCOs, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 34–
35. 
30 Don M. Snider, “The U.S. Army as Profession,” in The Future of the Army Profession, Second 
Edition, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews, (Boston: The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2005), 12–13. 
31 Shemella 138. 
32 Matei 26, 28. 
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more often been used to provide primarily internal security since the end of World War 
II.33 These missions most often do not include the application of violence, but do include 
construction, humanitarian assistance, and so on.  
Mathurin Houngnikpo identifies Africa as a region where internal security 
outweighs external security. The lack of interstate conflict in Africa deflects emphasis from 
national security concerns and armies are used primarily for internal order.34 Dustin Sharp 
agrees, claiming internal threats are much higher in Africa than international threats, and 
they include poverty, inequality, violent crime, disease, famine, youth-demographic, 
etcetera.35 Counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and illegal immigration have become higher 
priority national security issues and increasingly involve military participation. Shemella 
expresses concern that these once infrequent missions are now so commonplace that states 
must decide if these have become military roles that will require changes to structure, 
training, and equipment.36 Continuous training and professional education is paramount 
because Abenheim says policing, state-building, and counterinsurgency—the roles African 
militaries are most likely to perform—often require soldiers to rely less on technology and 
more on their professionalism, education, and skill.37 
2. Democratic Civil-Military Relations  
The majority of works have civilian control of the military as the core characteristic 
of democratic civil-military relations. A sensible structure when the assumption is that 
militaries capable of defending a state are capable of controlling the state.38 Control implies 
a degree of power, which Huntington defines as “the capacity to control the behavior of 
                                                 
33 Edmunds, “What Are Armed Forces For,” 1060. 
34 Houngnikpo, “Civil Military Relations in Africa,” in Guarding the Guardians: Civil-Military 
Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2016), 60. 
35 Dustin Sharp, “Accountability: A Critical Link in the Security-Development Nexus,” in The U.S. 
Military in Africa: Enhancing Security and Development?, ed. Jessica Piombo, (Boulder, CO: First Forum 
Press, 2015), 66. 
36 Shemella, 133. 
37 Abenheim, 225. 
38 Matei, 30. 
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other people.”39 This definition of power is critical to Huntington’s primary focus, the 
military officer’s role in relation to the state and statesman.40 The soldier recognizes the 
state as the highest political authority of society. He sees security as a political objective 
and war serves the political objective.41 Claude E. Welch largely agrees that “civilian 
control exist [sic] if the officer corps has internalized the value of civilian supremacy as 
part of its ethical makeup.”42 That ethical decision, Huntington argues, is the officers’ 
identity as a military professional; an expert in military affairs who abstains from politics.43  
Finer disagrees with Huntington’s assertion that civilian control is the result of the 
military’s apolitical professionalism. The military is a political force with superior 
organization and armament.44 The military’s strength rests within its warfighting skills, so 
subordination to civilian authority is therefore not natural. Finer states the military can 
choose to subordinate itself, act against its government, or refuse to follow the state’s 
orders.45 However, most militaries recognize their inability to manage both a complex state 
administration and national security.46 Furthermore, advanced societies consider rule by 
force as illegitimate. Finer argues the decision to subordinate itself to civilian authority is 
pragmatic, and thus civilian control of the military is the rule and not the exception.  
Brian M. Linn agrees, saying the concept of professionalism changes over time so 
Huntington’s apolitical professionalism is “not a solid basis on which to build an argument 
about democratic civilian control.”47 Welch concurs and claims that “all armed forces 
                                                 
39 Huntington, 86. 
40 Huntington, 3. 
41 Huntington, 65. 
42 Jose A. Olmeda, “Escape from Huntington’s labyrinth: Civil-military relations and comparative 
politics,” in The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina 
Cristiana Matei, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 64. 
43 Huntington, 70–71. 
44 Finer, 5. 
45 Finer, 23. 
46 Finer, 14. 
47 Brian M. Linn, quoted in Bruneau, “Impediments to the accurate conceptualization of civil-military 
relations,” 17. 
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participate in politics in various fashions.”48 Today’s soldiers live in a mass politics 
environment, according to Abenheim, implying that soldiers participate in politics at least 
on a personal level.49 Alfred Stepan sees the politicization of the military contributing to 
“military-political managerialism and role expansion.”50 However, the degree of political 
participation is key to achieving democratic civil-military relations. So is the civilian 
authority’s approach to getting the military’s support. 
Serra attests there is no clear theory of military transition to democratic civilian 
control and demonstrates that similar states take different paths to military transition with 
different results.51 Edmunds believes weak and fragmented states prove most challenging 
in achieving democratic civilian control of the armed forces because legitimacy is already 
low and there may be no guarantee the military will act in the interests of the state or its 
people.52 In this context, scholars equate democratization of civil-military relations with 
reducing military prerogatives after transition to democracy. Alfred Stepan for one 
identifies 11 prerogatives that once minimized would pave the way toward democratic 
civilian control.53 These military prerogatives concern the constitutionally sanctioned role 
of the military; the relationship to the chief executive; the coordination of the defense 
sector; military participation in the cabinet; the legislature’s role in the military; the role of 
civil servants and political appointees; intelligence collection roles; roles in policing; 
promotions; the role in state enterprises; and the role in the legal system. Edmunds claims 
militaries may resist new roles or reductions in power and privilege, and regimes may 
politicize militaries to bully opposition.54  
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Serra notes democratization of civil-military relations can be achieved via specific 
military reforms. He opines that “military reform is a process driving and guiding the 
military to shift gradually to positions of greater democratic normalcy and to fit coherently 
into the new democratic state,” specifically in regard to shifting autonomy to match the 
rule of law.55 Political change —or perhaps consistency in some regards— must precede 
military changes and be moving in the same direction.56 Sharp identifies that some regimes 
may fear that enforcing accountability or pushing military reforms may imperil their 
regime.57 Therefore, Larry Diamond concludes democracy must be legitimate and serve 
the state triad “of institutions-civil society-military.”58 The military is more likely to 
intervene or attempt to resist transition and stay outside the scope of civilian control if 
democracy fails to work, does not solve societal problems, or loses its legitimacy.  
Democratic civilian control is a choice and results in a contract between the military 
and civilian authority that should create a symbiotic relationship. According to Serra, 
political parties must refrain from politicizing the military or its leaders to maintain the 
military’s vital political neutrality.59 This neutrality, according to Huntington, obligates the 
statesman, who in a democratic system cannot be the military professional, to accept the 
judgments of the military profession even if he does not have to follow the advice they 
provide.60 The military must represent military security in state activities and keep political 
leaders abreast of states of readiness, requirements, and relative combat power. When the 
relationship is working well, Serra claims it allows militaries to maintain some autonomy 
over internal functions and remain separate from society but the state must determine the 
roles of the military and how the military will manage its missions, structure, training, and 
equipping.61 Eliot Cohen concurs, arguing the best civilian leaders do not allow the military 
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to overwhelm politics in war and that they “combine strategic vision with tactical 
flexibility” and understand the need to shape the strategic battle space for future tactical 
and operational success, which the generals will determine and execute.62 
Under democratic civilian control the “executive defines military policy” through 
elected and ministerial authority.63 Tension remains between the two over categories of 
military semi-autonomy and how the military lobbies the executive and legislative to 
achieve and “defend the corporate interests of the military.”64 However, Serra further 
explains that a transitioned and democratic military is subordinate to civil authorities, 
respects the rule of law and the law of the land, and is loyal to the state institutions.65 Sharp 
agrees, saying the “rule of law is... essential to ensure transparency, accountability, and 
control of security forces.”66 Houngnikpo explains it alternatively saying militaries should 
serve the constitution or law, not concepts of nation or state.67 This supports the soldier-
state model of professionalism discussed above. 
Florina Cristiana Matei suggests too much literature and policy focuses on 
strengthening civilian control instead of other aspects of civil-military relations.68 
Therefore, she introduces a new paradigm of civil-military relations that argues civilian 
authorities should also strive to build and manage effective and efficient militaries. Matei 
submits that more emphasis should be placed on effective civilian control that can place 
strategic planning and oversight in the hands of civilian personnel while facilitating the 
military’s focus on training for missions.69 Thomas Bruneau agrees, but adds that while the 
effectiveness of civilian control is important, so is military effectiveness.70 Overall 
effectiveness of civil-military relations in this construct attempts to measure how well 
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prepared the military is to execute the six functions of wars, internal wars, terrorism, crime, 
humanitarian assistance, and peace operations. Measuring effectiveness in war is easy, 
according to Matei.71 Effectiveness in the other roles is difficult because it can be hard to 
prove a negative; there is no clear means to discern if an event did not occur because 
security was effective or because the perpetrators chose not to attack for other reasons, 
such as a lack of funding or manpower.  
Measuring efficiency is also an aspect of the new civil-military relations paradigm. 
Paul Shemella concludes all states want to be peacekeepers but want the flexibility to move 
toward warfighters.72 This implies that militaries train and equip for roles they may never 
perform. The type and duration of military roles has an impact on society, especially on 
economies. Shemella states frequently changing military roles requires expensive 
retraining and equipment acquisition, and may reduce security in the long run.73 The 
military will be inefficient unless roles and missions are determined by the civilian 
authority and remain stable.74 Waste and duplication of effort must be eliminated to achieve 
greater efficiencies. Shemella further argues democratic states conduct strategic planning 
through debate between branches horizontally and agencies vertically.75  
Tom Bruneau believes the degree to which militaries are effectively and efficiently 
prepared to achieve roles and missions is more important than basic civil control, and 
measuring all three shows the achievement of democratic civil-military relations.76 This is 
extremely difficult in the contemporary security environment because the roles and 
missions have expanded beyond external security. The literature indicates that civil-
military relations is most complete when civilian control of the military ensures effective 
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and efficient accomplishment of a variety of military roles and missions; what Bruneau 
calls the trinity of civil-military relations.77  
3. The Impact of Training and Education Programs on Military 
Professionalism 
Joseph Soeterss and Audrey Van Ouytsel point out that Western states have long 
sought to professionalize developing state militaries to share the international security 
burden.78 They show that many recipient state officers attend military academies and 
military professional education residence programs in Western states, and then return to 
their home states. France, in particular, offers academy positions to officers from more than 
twenty African states. Training also frequently occurs in the donor state. Both overseas and 
at home training, say Soeterss and Van Ouytsel, includes primarily soldiering skills with 
some emphasis on social responsibility and corporateness.79  
Despite this training and education, Soeters and Van Ouytsel claim the transfer of 
professional skills often does not occur because different states have varying regard for 
different professional skills.80 Edmunds suggests another reason, saying that building and 
adapting military roles in “recipient” states has been informed by the “donor” “states” 
experience in the post-Cold War environment, wherein they attempting to create carbon 
copy militaries with little understanding of the recipient state’s context.81  
Soeters and Van Ouytsel offer the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Benin as 
two different examples of the failure to sustain transfer of training and professional 
education. Officers and cadets from both states attend or have attended academies in 
Belgium. Cadets from Democratic Republic of the Congo typically do not transfer skills 
from the military academy in Belgium because they desert the army shortly after their 
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return to the DRC.82 Benin cadets remain in their army after completing the military 
academy in Belgium, so it would be presumed the transfer of training and professional 
education would take hold. However, Soeters and Van Ouytsel show that senior and 
seasoned leaders of the Benin military are unlikely to listen to or accept the professionalism 
and training reforms suggested by the young officers trained in Belgium. The patrimonial 
character of their system and hierarchy makes new methods seem threatening to their 
leadership status in the organization. Young Beninese officers become frustrated over time 
and set aside what they learned, resulting in an externally trained army that sees no 
improvement in either model of professionalism.83 
Krebs raises additional concerns for the military’s ability to implement and sustain 
training and professional education. He says that militaries are a reflection of the society 
as a whole and the problems within the society, such as ethnic or political cleavages, can 
be drawn into the military.84 While the contemporary U.S. military is an example of how 
state demographics, at least in the shape of leadership roles, do not mirror societal 
demographics, this may not be so in Africa and other developing states. Krebs argues 
soldiers bring with them preconceived beliefs and character traits, some of which are bad, 
and that military training and education cannot eliminate or replace them all.85 Mamadou 
Diouma Bah adds the military can almost serve as an ethnic identity on its own, created by 
military elites to serve the purpose of achieving roles and missions.86 Finer seemingly 
agrees, saying the barracks mentality can “inspire contempt for one’s own nationals—the 
‘civies’, ‘les pekins’, ‘les bourgeois’,—and so forth.”87 Can professionalism transcend 
preexisting ethnic cleavages and is it strong enough to prevent the establishment of “an 
exclusionist mentality” that creates animosity toward certain groups or political leaders? 
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Krebs, Bah, and Finer contend the military man not serve as an all-transforming experience 
and potentially unable to positively reinforce training and professional education efforts.88  
4. Professionalism and Military Intervention in Politics 
Professional and transformed militaries must be able “to master the problems of 
war and peace” according to Abenheim.89 However, in line with Finer’s theory, 
Houngnikpo says military professionalism has not stopped militaries from intervening in 
politics or attempting coups, especially if they believe the current regime impairs the 
national security.90 He says there are two reasons for the military to intervene: (1) motives 
to intervene must outweigh motives for not intervening; (2) army must be willing to act.91 
Weak or ineffective civilian political institutions are most vulnerable, especially in states 
where democratic civil-military transition is incomplete or immature.92 Edmunds concurs, 
offering there may be no guarantee in weak states that the military will act in the interests 
of the state or its people.93 Houngnikpo claims that interventions and coups are the result 
of protracted state failures and often combined with militaries that believe it is “the 
soldier’s destiny to be the savior of his country.”94 Fortunately, Jonathan Powell suggests 
coups have decreased since the end of the Cold War.95 This is likely because coup-plotters 
are rational actors who weigh costs and benefits of conducting a coup, which could range 
from exile to imprisonment or execution.96  
The transfer or presence of either professionalism model is not a clear indicator that 
a military will intervene politically or maintain its neutrality. Bruneau says that 
professional officers in Latin America have often pushed back on civilian control because 
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of their concerns the civilian authorities know too little about military roles, missions, and 
needs.97 Zoltan Barany recalls that Chile’s armed forces had been trained and educated by 
the British navy, U.S. Air Force, and the Prussian Army before they overturned the civilian 
government in 1973.98 On the other hand, Jessica Piombo details the post-apartheid 
democratic transition of the South African Defence Force to the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF). The SANDF did not always agree with the decisions of the 
civilian authority, but “most officers firmly believe[d] that the military profession must and 
should be subordinate to civilian leadership,” and maintained their political neutrality.99 
Saidou Norou Tall adds that Senegal lacks the capacity [as of 2008] to adequately train and 
educate its soldiers, relying on France, Germany and the United States to provide 
equipment and training.100 It is unlikely the Senegalese military has been able to sustain 
either professional model; yet, Tall says they have not conducted a coup or otherwise 
intervened in politics.101 The literature indicates mixed results on professionalism as a 
variable that prevents the military from intervening in politics. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Existing scholarship explains military professionalism, defines democratic civil-
military relations, demonstrates how training and professional education sometimes fails 
to transfer to recipient states, and shows that professional militaries do occasionally 
intervene in politics. However, the literature neither adequately address if militaries decide 
to transition to democratic civilian control because of learning new behaviors nor how 
those behaviors are learned. The DoD regularly trains foreign militaries across the globe, 
including specific training and professional education programs, and has done so through 
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theater security cooperation for decades. This thesis will attempt to determine if these 
programs can improve military professionalism in a way that results in transitions to 
democratic civil-military relations. Additional research has the potential to provide 
frameworks to improve future training and professional education programs.  
This thesis presumes that any military undertaking an externally driven training and 
professional education program will achieve short-term increases in soldiering skills 
professionalism. However, sustaining change will require iterative training and 
professional education with donor state forces or the establishment of homegrown training 
and professional education programs or institutions. This thesis also presumes the training 
and professional education of African militaries is part of broader democratization and 
development programs that have been key aspects of U.S. foreign policy for decades. In 
this context, the key is Finer’s concept that the military will not intervene in politics only 
if the military believes explicitly in the principle of civilian supremacy—that the military 
works for the government in power and not the state.102 These programs are likely to have 
a limited positive effect on civil-military relations if they are not part of this comprehensive 
framework. Therefore, training and professional education for African militaries has four 
possible effects on civil-military relations.  
The first hypothesis is that professional education and training will result in 
increased military effectiveness but decreased civilian control. This result could occur 
because donor states “may emphasize military effectiveness at the cost of promoting 
civilian control of the armed forces” in order to achieve donor state security objectives in 
the recipient state, such as counter-terrorism.103 Training and equipping recipient militaries 
is easier and more measurable than professional education.104 
The second hypothesis is that professional education and training will result in 
increased military effectiveness and increased civilian control. This could result when 
training and professional education emphasize soldiering skills along with the rule of law, 
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the benefits of civilian control, and the need for political neutrality in the armed forces. 
This could also be more likely to occur in consolidated democracies where militaries are 
more comfortable with civilian control because they have experienced at least two 
consecutive peaceful transitions from incumbent to challenger.105 The more advanced the 
democratic consolidation, the less likely military intervention will occur. The military can 
not only remain in barracks, but can also grow more comfortable ceding certain decisions 
to the civilian authorities while the military focuses on internal structure, professional 
education, and training to achieve its assigned roles and missions.  
The third hypothesis is that professional education and training will result in 
decreased military effectiveness and increased civilian control. This result is possible in 
consolidating democracies, such as Argentina, which transitioned to democracy in 1982, 
where despite foreign education and training, aimed at promoting both democratic civilian 
control and effectiveness of the armed forces, the democratic civilian authorities have 
intentionally repressed and humiliated the military for misdeeds during the previous 
regime.106  
The fourth hypothesis is that professional education and training will result in 
decreased military effectiveness and decreased civilian control. This could occur in 
democracies with weak, corrupt, and/or neopatrimonial systems that erode both the 
military’s and the civilian authority’s professionalism. This could also be possible in 
countries with where democracy regresses. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will provide a comparative study of the current military roles and status 
of civil-military relations in Senegal and Cameroon. Primary and secondary sources will 
be used to conduct qualitative research on empirical evidence. These states provide a 
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relevant comparison because of their different regime types and because 
MARFORAFRICOM has chosen them to implement its training and professional 
education program. Both states also have similarities besides their littoral orientation. Both 
have French colonial ties. Both states’ economies are based on commodities exports.107 
Both states are also under increasing pressure from piracy and violent extremist groups, 
although Cameroon’s experience with the latter is more violent and occurs within the state 
instead as well as in peripheral states. Understanding their political and military history 
since independence compared to their contemporary state composition will give insight to 
how the training and professional education programs and any other security sector reforms 
will be accepted.  
This thesis will also use two case studies to assess the potential impacts of 
externally driven military training and professional education on Senegal and Cameroon. 
Colombia and El Salvador are analyzed due to their commonalities with Africa generally, 
and Cameroon and Senegal specifically. The DoD initiated training and professional 
education programs with Colombia and El Salvador in the 1980s and 1990s during the 
height of their respective insurgencies. Colombia experienced increased professionalism 
and democratization of civil-military affairs. El Salvador’s experience, on the other hand, 
was negative, with the military becoming more political and more indiscriminate in its use 
of violence. 
The first similarity involves the nature of their national security challenges. Very 
little interstate conflict or dispute exists in both Latin America and Africa that would 
require large, well-equipped militaries, and therefore the militaries in these regions are not 
built for long-term expeditionary operations and conflict. Latin America has experienced 
only two interstate wars since 1945.108 Africa has also experienced only two interstate wars 
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since the first wave of African independence in 1957.109 These states are much more likely 
to view international mitigation as the best resource for interstate conflict resolution and 
seek to cooperate on common security concerns through bilateral or multilateral exercises 
and operations.110 Most Latin American states are satisfied with their territorial boundaries 
and do not seek expansion. In comparison, African states agreed in the 1960s to keep the 
territorial boundaries developed during colonialism and the result has been very little 
change in the decades since.111 The four states also have similar defense budgets based on 
gross domestic product (GDP). Colombia and El Salvador spend 3.4 and 0.9 percent of 
GDP, respectively, while Cameroon and Senegal spend 1.2 percent and 1.7 percent of 
GDP.112  
A second similarity between Latin America and Africa is instability. Weak 
governance capacity and weak institutions drive instability in Latin America, and this has 
also plagued Africa.113 The military is often seen as one of the more developed, 
bureaucratic, and administratively adept government agencies and, therefore, 
professionalizing the military is often seen as a means of improving governance. Porous 
borders, ungoverned spaces, and crime are historical concerns in Latin America and fueled 
the rise of leftist insurgencies during the second half of the 20th Century that resulted in 
significant U.S. military aid.114 Political instability, porous borders, and ungoverned spaces 
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in Africa facilitate the proliferation of violent extremist organizations and since 2001, has 
resulted in increased U.S. military aid.115  
A final similarity between Latin America and Africa arises from their political 
economies. All four economies are primary products based, largely consisting of mineral 
or agricultural exports.116 The lack of external security threats has also meant that economic 
security may be a more important political issue than traditional security issues for Latin 
American countries.117 This holds true for Africa as well, where many economies are 
growing but have not transformed into developed and industrialized economies.118 The 
common belief that security and stability is required for economic development drives the 
internal security focus of both regions.  
The similarities in their security challenges and political economy present 
Colombia and El Salvador as appropriate case studies to determine how military training 
and professional education can impact civil military relations in Cameroon and Senegal. 
The case studies will analyze how DoD implemented the programs in Colombia and El 
Salvador and determine whether the programs were integrated into holistic reforms. The 
results will be informative for implementing the training and professional education 
programs in Senegal and Cameroon. 
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E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the subject, 
providing a foundation for understanding the research problem. The literature review 
provides scholarly context for democratic transitions in contemporary civil-military 
relations and outlines the civil-military relations framework I intend to use in the research. 
Chapter II explains security cooperation programs —the primary methods the United States 
uses to train and educate foreign militaries— and security sector reform, as well as outlines 
current U.S. strategy toward Africa. Chapter III will provide case studies of DoD training 
and professional education programs in Colombia and El Salvador during the 1980s and 
1990s. The outcomes and context of these programs will provide insight for the analysis of 
MARFORAFRICOM’s programs. Chapter IV provides a comparison of the political 
environment, military roles, and status of civil-military relations in Senegal and Cameroon. 
A historical analysis will detail each state’s post-independence evolution in these topic 
areas and provide a baseline for understanding how training and professional education 
programs may impact their civil-military relations. Chapter V will describe and analyze the 
training and professional education programs intended for Senegal and Cameroon. The 
chapter will also analyze other U.S. government development programs in each state and 
how they are integrated with the professionalization program. Finally, this chapter will 
assess the training and professional education program’s prospects for success in each state, 
and test the hypotheses. The conclusion will identify potential trap-falls and provide 
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II. SECURITY COOPERATION, SECURITY SECTOR REFORM, 
AND THE U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD AFRICA  
Understanding how U.S. military training and professional education can increase 
foreign military professionalism and has the potential to influence civil-military relations 
requires knowledge of the reasons the United States seeks to train foreign forces and the 
programs it uses. The United States cannot achieve its strategic security objectives alone; 
therefore, it seeks partners with the common security interests of improving regional 
security, developing professional militaries, defeating terrorism, and addressing other 
transnational threats.119 These partners work in conjunction with the United States in some 
cases and may serve as proxies in others.  
The 2017 United States National Security Strategy posits that U.S. power is 
magnified through its allies and partners who must “shoulder a fair share of the burden of 
responsibility to protect against common threats.”120 Training foreign forces seeks to 
increase foreign military capabilities and improve interoperability with U.S. forces and 
agencies across the range of security operations. Professional education for foreign forces 
seeks to build their capacity to operate independently and further develop their own forces, 
while promoting an American image of military professionalism that includes a focus on 
military ethos, respect for human rights, and subordination to civilian authority. Both 
training and education professionalize the militaries, but the former is more associated with 
the soldiering skills model of professionalism while the latter is associated with the soldier-
state model.  
This Chapter discusses security cooperation as the primary means of training and 
educating foreign militaries, as well as the more holistic concept of security sector reform. 
Also discussed is the United States’ military strategy for Africa and why professionalizing 
partner militaries nests within the greater national security. The objectives, constraints, 
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restraints, and potential outcomes are detailed below to better understand the case studies 
presented in the following chapters and the final analysis of how U.S. military training and 
professional education impact the democratization of civil-military relations in Africa.  
A. RATIONALE AND METHOD: SECURITY COOPERATION 
The United States has been educating and training foreign militaries through a set 
of activities that are known as security cooperation in order to meet U.S. national security 
and foreign policy objectives.121 Security cooperation developed during the Cold War as a 
U.S. strategic perception that securing partners advances trade and limits new military 
competition.122 Security cooperation includes “all DoD interactions with foreign defense 
establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, 
develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational 
operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host 
nation.”123 Most developing states do not have the internal capacity to professionalize their 
militaries and enhancing partner capability and capacity through training and professional 
education helps to maintain security and influences adversaries and non-partners alike.124 
Regional stability is a key national security objective of the United States, because it is 
believed to inhibit terrorism and reduce the need for future U.S. military intervention.125 
Therefore, creating effective and efficient security forces is a step in achieving stability.126 
Additional reasons why the United States is conducting security cooperation include 
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concern for the welfare of allies, U.S. political concerns such as fostering diplomatic 
relations, and the desire to relieve human suffering.127 Regional military balances of power 
favorable to the United States is also a justification for security cooperation, as are creating 
security arrangements that facilitate access to partner states, advancing mutual defense, and 
preventing conflict and crisis.128 Security cooperation seeks to prevent fragile states from 
turning into regional crises, through providing the training, education, and equipment to 
help states resolve their own problems.129  
Currently, the United States conducts some degree of security cooperation in more 
than 150 countries. This seeks to build foreign military capabilities and capacity. A 
capability is “‘the ability to generate a desired effect’ in a military operation, under a set of 
conditions, and to a specific standard.”130 Capacity is the ability for foreign forces to 
respond to crises over a range of operations without the assistance of the United States and 
achieve interoperability with international security structures.131 The United States Federal 
Code (Title 10) also identifies military-to-military contacts and cooperation as 
opportunities to encourage democratic ideals within foreign forces.132 The U.S. military 
has a respected reputation globally and because foreign militaries are often the best 
developed and most respected bureaucracies in their state, this gives the militaries an 
advantage over other agencies to achieve democratic reform.133 A belief also exists within 
U.S. political leadership that American military training can encourage indigenous 
militaries to conform to the U.S. military’s morality standards.134 Each leads to an 
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increased imperative for security cooperation and there are many aspects of security 
cooperation used to achieve these ends. 
The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is one of the 
most commonly used aspects of security cooperation and the primary tool for training and 
educating foreign forces. Created as part of the International Security Assistance and Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976, IMET, which is funded by the Department of State, is used to 
increase understanding and interoperability, build self-reliance in foreign forces, and gain 
more oversight of human rights.135 The IMET allows the United States to operate military 
schools abroad and facilitates attendance by foreign troops at military schools in the United 
States.136 Examples of these institutions are the Naval Postgraduate School, the Marshall 
Center, the National Defense Universities, the U.S. service War Colleges, the Marine 
Corps’ The Basic School, and the Army’s Western Hemisphere Institute for Security 
Cooperation. The IMET program allows foreign soldiers to come to the United States and 
encourages interpersonal relationships with U.S. troops that, through exposure to American 
military professionalism and cultural norms, hence, encourages respect for human rights. 
For example, at least 15 percent of Army War College classes each year are foreign 
students.137 In addition to attendance at formal schools, the IMET also provides shorter 
duration defense management, law enforcement, civil-military relations, and military 
justice courses for foreign forces in the United States and abroad.138 The personal 
relationships built between U.S. and foreign troops is hard to measure, but may be the most 
important aspect.139 A former commander of the U.S. European Command, General Bantz 
Craddock, says IMET is the best security cooperation tool because of its low cost but high 
return due to relationship-building and technical training it provides. Other programs also 
facilitate security cooperation goals.  
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Security cooperation is not an available option for all states and the programs have 
many constraints and restraints to ensure the programs do not achieve negative results such 
as fraud, waste, and abuse, or result in partner militaries committing human rights abuses. 
The U.S. Congress began regulating security cooperation in 1961 as part of the Foreign 
Assistance Act. The law has been updated several times since and the 1973 revision made 
military assistance contingent on human rights protections and created the DoS Office of 
Human Rights to assist in oversight.140 Substantiated and consistent gross violations of 
international law on human rights should prevent U.S. military aid.  
The most stringent oversight tool is the 1997 Leahy Law that amended the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961. Created largely in response to the human rights violations during 
the Salvadoran civil war during the 1980s and in Colombia during the 1990s, the Leahy 
Law increased conditionality for assistance down to the unit level.141 Units with as few as 
one individual implicated in human rights abuses could be black listed for military 
assistance. The Leahy Law also specifically identified torture, enforced disappearance, 
political rape, and extrajudicial killing as trip lines to prevent military assistance.142 The 
law reflects an awareness that socialization does not always lead to reform and 
acknowledges that training human rights abusers —past, present, or future— implies U.S. 
guilt by association.143 The law seeks accountability for human rights abusers and provides 
oversight of the security cooperation programs that trained them. Therefore, the Leahy Law 
also made conditional assistance more proactive by requiring that all foreign units and 
personnel be vetted before participating in any security cooperation program. Military 
assistance can be resumed if the Secretary of State determines the partner state has made 
serious attempts to prevent future abuses and has sought to hold abusers accountable.144 
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However, conditionality is also at the discretion of the president and the national security 
team and can be waived if aid is deemed an emergency; although what determines an 
emergency has not been codified.145 Another restraint is that all military activities with a 
partner state are supposed to be approved by and coordinated through the U.S. 
ambassador.146 
Security cooperation can have both positive and negative outcomes, even when 
operating within the existing oversight. The most measurable positive effect can be the 
increase in soldering skills that results in increased effectiveness in the application of the 
art and science of war. New tactics and equipment, as well as improved decision making 
can lead to increased tactical efficiency, wherein militaries can achieve operational success 
while expending less blood and treasure. Foreign militaries can also see improvement in 
professional attitudes toward the state, the rule of law, and an acceptance of the supremacy 
of civil authority. However, security cooperation can become associated with human rights 
violations and military coups, as happened in El Salvador and Colombia in the former and 
in Thailand in the latter. Recipient states can also sometimes mistakenly see security 
cooperation as being equal to mutual security agreements, leading them to be either 
aggressive toward other states or more intense in their response due to a misperception the 
United States will come to their aid.147 Partner states may also see security cooperation as 
a form of patron-client relationship, like those developed in much of the world during the 
Cold War. Positive outcomes are more likely if security cooperation is nested within 
security sector reform. 
B. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 
Security cooperation is a combination of training, equipping, and professional 
education for foreign militaries, but on its own is not security sector reform.148 Achieving 
long-term capabilities, interoperability, and capacity, however, is more likely when 
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security institutions and governance functions are well-developed.149 Therefore, security 
cooperation programs should not be executed in a vacuum and should be a subset of an 
overarching security sector reform program.150 The DoS defines security sector reform as 
“reform efforts directed at the institutions, processes, and forces that provide security and 
promote the rule of law.”151 It also improves efficiency in the security sector, improves 
accountability, and is an essential ingredient for stability.152 The security sector or security 
system implies all of the organizations that contribute to security: military, police, 
intelligence, justice, and potentially some civil-service organizations.153 Civil society 
organizations—think tanks, public policy organizations, university, non-governmental 
organizations, and media—can be included in security sector reform activities and 
consultation.154 The security sector can also include presidential guards, civil defense 
forces, and militias.155 Security sector reform recognizes the explicit link between well-
developed, functioning security institutions and good governance.156 Both are also viewed 
as complementary and reinforcing. The rule of law and transparent, responsive, and 
accountable governance is required for security sector reform to be effective and lasting.157 
Therefore, the environments and state/regime types are major considerations for security 
sector reform and how it should be planned and implemented.158 
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Weak security and governance institutions in several African states has led to 
failures in both public and citizen security. “Public security is the ability of a government 
to maintain civil order necessary for the execution of basic functions such as commerce, 
transportation, and communication.”159 “Citizen security [is]... the capacity of individuals 
and groups to exercise the political, economic, civil, and human rights that make them 
citizens.”160 Insecurity has given rise to violent extremist organizations and organized 
crime. Professionalism programs for Africa’s militaries could improve security sector 
reform by developing partner nation defense institutions and by building interoperability 
and capacity.161 These militaries will inevitably sharpen their skills, lethality, and perhaps 
increase their professionalism, but will be challenged to achieve greater impact on 
governance, security, and democratization without significant training and education 
focused on the institutions within and having authority over the security sector.162 
Security sector reform uses several concepts and activities to teach interagency 
cooperation, values, and principles to build state capacity to conduct whole of government 
operations.163 Restructuring the armed forces to reflect their roles and missions is one 
concept.164 An example may be teaching budget management to defense ministries to gain 
accountability of security force budgets, make them more efficient and relative to roles and 
missions, and decrease corruption.165 Other examples would be working with legislatures 
to build committees that provide oversight of security forces and the strengthening of the 
judiciary, both military and civilian, to improve its political impartiality and capacity to 
maintain accountability of the security sector and other aspects of the government.166  
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Security sector reform must be holistic to achieve democratization of civil-military 
relations. Focusing on the rule of law is required to establish control, accountability, and 
transparency of security forces.167 U.S. participation in security sector reform could be in 
the form of exercises and training that must focus on the range of human and state security 
threats and causes, to include accountability and impunity.168 Accountability is an 
important public good and security sector reform should encourage the development of 
civil-society to participate in holding the security sector accountable directly, and also 
indirectly by establishing interest groups that promote accountability and assist civilians 
who have been victims.169 Holistic security sector reform has the potential to establish 
effective civil control, build a professional military capable of performing the six roles and 
serving as a “school for the nation,” and creating a legitimate military upon which civil-
society can build its national identity. 
C. U.S. STRATEGY, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND SECURITY 
SECTOR REFORM IN AFRICA 
The national security strategy for Africa seeks to create and support relationships 
that counter terrorist threats in Africa and threats to U.S. interests in Africa, Europe, and 
the Middle East.170 Strategic success has been identified by the U.S. Africa Command 
(AFRICOM) as states that provide their own security and contribute to regional security, 
can mitigate violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and have democratic civil-military 
relations.171 Increased economic development and democracy are also measures of 
success.172 Security cooperation is seen by AFRICOM as inadequate to achieving 
persistent stability without creating security institutions that are capable and sustainable. 
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Since African insecurity is due to a lack of effective governance and not necessarily due to 
a lack of military professionalism and training, it cannot be solved by more military training 
and equipment alone.173 Therefore, AFRICOM seeks to build “professional, legitimate 
defense institutions... that prioritizes the security of the population over the security of the 
regime.”174 Improving African security forces and governments to resist VEOs and other 
destabilizing threats is a key component to achieving AFRICOM’s mission and U.S. 
national security interests.175 
Four defense-oriented goals provided by African states have been identified and 
incorporated within AFRICOM’s strategy.176 The first is professional and capable 
militaries that are accountable for their actions. The second is security institutions that are 
professional and legitimate with the capacity to support and sustain the military. The third 
is a credible deterrence against internal and external threats. The fourth is the desire and 
capacity to support regional and international peacekeeping operations. A fifth could also 
be to train African militaries to a capacity to train other African units.177 Pursuing these 
goals directly supports U.S. strategic objectives and will serve as a reinforcing function for 
building regional stability.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This thesis focuses primarily on military training and professional education 
because they are easier to measure in the short-term through exercises and operations 
compared to civil-military relations, respect for human rights, and other security missions 
which can often only be measured in the long-term by seeing how well commerce occurs 
and through observing governance.178 Training and professional education are also the 
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most common security operations conducted. However, failing to understand how training 
and professional education fit into the larger security cooperation and security sector 
reform concepts has the potential to achieve marginal results at best and negative results, 
such as increased violence and human rights violations, at worst. Security cooperation and 
security sector reform activities must meet U.S. strategic objectives, one of which is 
building foreign partner capacity to conduct mutually benefiting security operations 
independently of the United States.179 These activities should also be complimentary to 
other U.S. government activities.180 Military professionalization programs that are not 
integrated with other sector reforms have resulted in negative results in some cases.181 
Furthermore, the experience of counterinsurgencies and counterterrorism in the 21st 
Century —the primary contemporary U.S. military operation— has proven that increased 
lethality alone is not sufficient to solve security problems182  
Security cooperation and security sector reform must also be based on the local 
political and geographical context in order to be successful.183 American civil-military 
relations, developed and codified over more than 200 years of trial and error, may not work 
in African states who became independent only in the second half of the 20th Century.184 
It is unlikely that a lack of civilian control of the military is the primary obstacle to 
achieving democratic civil-military relations in Africa. So the question is this: Can U.S. 
led military training and professional education have a positive impact on democratizing 
civil-military relations? The remaining chapters will attempt to answer this question. 
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III. CASE STUDY: THE EFFECTS OF U.S. MILITARY TRAINING 
AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION IN COLOMBIA AND EL 
SALVADOR 
United States led military training and professional education programs for foreign 
militaries improve their effectiveness in conducting self-defense and coalition operations, 
and the programs seek to integrate views on security challenges and “encourage a 
democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other countries.”185 
Success in these areas increases the likelihood of successful combined operations –where 
the U.S. military works in concert with partner militaries on specific missions. It also better 
prepares partner militaries to operate unilaterally on security challenges that meet U.S. 
strategic objectives. This Chapter reviews Colombia’s and El Salvador’s experiences with 
U.S. military training and education from the 1970s through the 1990s, in an attempt to 
identify potential impacts of the U.S. training on soldiering skills, military professionalism, 
and civil-military relations. The training sought to professionalize the Colombian and 
Salvadoran armies and increase their combat effectiveness.186 Both militaries improved 
soldiering skills. Both became more effective at locating and attacking their enemies. 
However, both became notorious for their human rights abuses, largely due to the 
institutionalization of violence at varying levels of both states. Furthermore, each achieved 
a different outcome in regards to professionalism and the evolution of civil-military 
relations. This Chapter will detail the training the United States provided to the armed 
forces of both nations during that time and attempt to explain the different outcomes. A 
future chapter will use this analysis to inform potential outcomes of U.S. training in 
Cameroon and Senegal. 
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A. BACKGROUND ON THE VIOLENCE AND THE ROLES OF THE 
ARMED FORCES IN EL SALVADOR AND COLOMBIA 
El Salvador and Colombia both experienced internal security crises in the 1980s 
and 1990s that required extensive attempts by their armed forces to quell them and drew 
military aid and training from the United States. This section will explain the roles, 
missions, and capabilities of the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) and the Colombian 
Armed Forces (COLAR) during this period. It will also demonstrate that the ESAF and 
COLAR grew increasingly violent toward non-combatants as the crises intensified and 
attempt to explain why. This will provide the military strategy background for why the 
United States chose to train both militaries.  
Both the ESAF and the COLAR were designed for different strategic purposes—
the ESAF to protect the landed elite and the COLAR to protect against external threats— 
but have historically been tasked to perform internal security roles and missions that 
specifically focused on domestic counterinsurgency. The ESAF was not designed to defend 
El Salvador from external threats.187 It was initially designed to conduct local security for 
wealthy landowners who also comprised the ruling elite. This created a patrimonial 
relationship that resulted in elite support and funding for the ESAF who, in turn, were 
extremely loyal to the elite and saw regime protection as its primary role. The elite used 
the ESAF to harshly repress leftist politicians, Jesuit priests, and civilians who protested 
El Salvador’s corruption and economic and political inequality starting in the late 1970s. 
By 1980, the ESAF’s primary role was to conduct counterinsurgency operations against 
the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) when it launched a civil war over 
ideology and economic inequality against the ruling elite.188 
The COLAR’s training and equipping has historically been focused on territorial 
defense.189 However, considering external threats have remained minimal compared to 
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multiple insurgencies and the rise of organized crime and narco-terrorism after 1960, the 
COLAR has been used to defeat domestic security threats to Colombia’s conservative 
government.190 To achieve this the COLAR was granted policing powers when the 
National Police were placed under the control of the Ministry of Defense by Decree no. 
1705 of 1960.191 Put another way, the Colombian armed forces, with its official police 
powers, are “oriented towards functions related to the control of internal public order.”192 
Therefore, the primary roles and missions the COLAR has been charged with and 
performed since the 1960s have been counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, counter-
organized crime, and counterterrorism.193   
The period encompassed in the case study was extremely violent in El Salvador and 
Colombia. Both armies increased their violence against insurgents, but violence also 
significantly increased against noncombatants. The Salvadoran civil war was an incredibly 
violent period and created a myth amongst U.S. observers that El Salvador was historically 
violent and backwards compared to the United States.194 Violence was considered a 
Salvadoran cultural norm. In this connection, American politicians and policy bureaucrats 
deemed Salvadorans as “an inherently violent society,” thereby differentiating Salvadoran 
troops from U.S. soldierly values and the U.S. Department of State (DoS) in 1982 believed 
that El Salvador could only achieve gradual improvement in curtailing its level of violence 
if it received U.S. military support. Violence had been a part of Salvadoran history, but it 
was overemphasized by U.S. officials considering there had been little political violence 
between the 1930s and the early 1970s.195 By 1980, however, violence had been 
institutionalized within the ESAF. 
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By the middle of the civil war, the CIA assessed that the Salvadoran citizen equally 
feared the FMLN insurgents and the ESAF.196 More than 10,000 civilians were killed by 
the ESAF in 1980.197 Salvadoran National Guard troops were also accused of the rape and 
murder of three U.S. nuns and a laywoman in 1980.198 A 1982 DoS report detailed 
extrajudicial killings of insurgent prisoners. The ESAF also worked with paramilitary death 
squads to locate and kill insurgents, often through torturing and then murdering civilians 
who were used as information sources.199 One incident is particularly unsettling and 
indicates the many means in which the ESAF incorporated violence. 
Thirty heavily armed men wearing army combat vests, but masked with 
hoods lettered ‘death squad’, came to my village and seized and killed a 
number of peasants. They went then to the neighboring village of Santa 
Helena, seized Robilia Hernandez, aged 21, raped and then decapitated her. 
Her relatives buried her head: the rest of her body was burned by her 
murderers. The head had been left in front of her relatives’ house. The 
members of the ‘death squad’ were evacuated that day by a Salvadoran 
army helicopter.200 
The death squads were ultraviolent and information received from Salvadoran military 
defector interviews suggests the death squads consisted of far more ESAF troops than non-
military personnel and included high-ranking officers.201  
Colombia was consistently one of the most dangerous countries in the world during 
the 1980s and 1990s. It had one of the highest homicide rates in the 1980s and the leading 
cause of death for Colombians in 1986 was homicide.202 Colombia’s increasing internal 
insecurity due to multiple active revolutionary, terrorist, and paramilitary groups led the 
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state to delegate policing of social protests and other public safety functions to the armed 
forces throughout the 1980s, to include military justice over civilians.203 The military 
established counter-guerrilla forces that conducted “civil-military activities and 
psychological actions aimed at the civilian population” amounting to selective repression 
in areas of guerrilla activity.204 Counter-guerrilla operations included food control and the 
creation of informant networks. Colombia also conducted a “para-institutional strategy” 
that used terror and paternalism to separate guerrillas from local populations.205 This 
indicates the COLAR viewed repression and violence against civilians as a justifiable 
method of accomplishing their counterinsurgency mission. 
El Salvador’s and Colombia’s ability to counter their respective leftist insurgency 
was in doubt and increasingly alarmed U.S. leaders who feared communist movements in 
Latin America. The Carter administration saw the potential collapse and replacement of El 
Salvador’s civil-military government with a left-wing, socialist, or communist government 
as a threat to the U.S. and the region.206 The ESAF in 1979 were poorly trained and poorly 
led, and the U.S. DoD “had little confidence” in their capacity or capabilities.207 The DoD 
assessed the ESAF needed “a dramatic transformation” in order to successfully meet the 
FMLN threat and therefore created a training and aid program and lobbied for presidential 
and congressional support to implement them.208 
The many insurgent and organized crime groups operating within Colombia in the 
1980s grew increasingly successful at grew increasingly successful at attacking the 
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COLAR and the government.209 Key events included attacks on military bases in Bogota, 
seizure of the Dominican Embassy in 1980 and capture of 14 ambassadors, and the 1985 
attack on the Palacio de Justicia that killed several Supreme Court justices.210 These events 
and others led Colombian and U.S. officials to believe that major military reform, aid, and 
training was necessary in order for the COLAR to defeat insurgent forces.211  
B. U.S.-LED MILITARY TRAINING, PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, AND 
AID IN COLOMBIA AND EL SALVADOR BETWEEN 1975 AND 2005 
Neither the ESAF nor the COLAR were prepared to achieve victory in their security 
crises and this, along with an ideological strategic posture, led the United States to provide 
military aid and training to both. Colombian security forces have received U.S. military aid 
since the 1960s and the United States also started training Salvadoran troops, mostly the 
national guard and police, and providing other military aid in the mid-1960s.212 The United 
States-led training and military aid through the 1970s resulted in improvements in 
capabilities and capacity for both states, and in the case of El Salvador, included developing 
intelligence services and special forces.213 However, the training and aid significantly 
increased beginning in 1981 as the security crises in El Salvador and Colombia began to 
be seen through a Cold War lens. 
This section will briefly explain how the U.S. military strategy for El Salvador and 
Colombia was nested within the overall U.S. national strategic policy as it related to the 
Cold War. It will also detail the military training, professional education, and aid that the 
United States provided to the ESAF and COLAR, setting the conditions for the next section 
describing the effects on each military.  
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The violence of the 1970s and 1980s in El Salvador and Colombia was tied to leftist 
insurgencies and placed into the overall context of the Cold War, resulting in U.S. military 
aid as an aspect of a strategic policy to stop the global spread of communism.214 El Salvador 
was seen as part of the wave of communist movements through Central America, and its 
close proximity to the United States—only a 1,000-mile plane ride to Houston, Texas— 
gave it a high priority for U.S. leadership. Thus, the Salvadoran civil war became a Cold 
War proxy fight when the United States funded the ESAF and the FMLN forces received 
funding from the USSR and Cuba [until approximately 1989].215 In Colombia, the merger 
of the Clandestine Colombian Communist Party and disparate leftist peasant groups into 
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in 1964 signaled a formal 
socialist movement within the country that drew support from Cuba and the Soviet Union 
and represented an existential threat to Colombia’s conservative ruling elite, who sought 
U.S. support to combat it.216  
Concerns over encroaching communist and socialist elements resulted in increasing 
military aid and training for the ESAF and COLAR, especially when enemy forces surged 
operations, such as the FMLN offensive of January 1980. Aid and training for the ESAF 
under U.S. President Jimmy Carter consisted of six personnel and were limited to non-
lethal training, including riot control, and the equipment provided to El Salvador ranged 
from bullet-proof vests to command and control helicopters.217 Beginning with the Ronald 
Reagan administration however, the 1981 military aid budget rose from a projected $5 
million, including nearly $500,000 for the International Military Education and Training 
Program to train Salvadoran officers in U.S. military doctrine and tactics for international 
security, to more than $49 million.218 The United States went from tepid support to fully 
funding El Salvador’s civil war one year into the Reagan administration, spending at least 
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$1 billion in military aid to El Salvador between 1980 and 1990.219 More than $85 million 
had been allocated to train the ESAF in 1991 as the civil war was ending. Colombia 
experienced similar upticks in military aid, especially with the implementation of Plan 
Colombia during the Clinton Administration, which provided more than $1 billion for 
security assistance and development aid tied to counterterrorism and counternarcotics 
operations.220  
1. Soldiering Skills Training 
While U.S. training and military aid for the ESAF promoted reform, its ultimate 
goal was training the Salvadoran army to defeat the growing insurgency.221 Trainers would 
focus mostly on operational and tactical level planning, infantry training, combat logistics 
and communications, reconnaissance and counterinsurgency operations, and fixed-wing 
aircraft pilot training.222 An early aspect of training and aiding the ESAF was to build its 
intelligence capability. The U.S. personnel who helped El Salvador establish their 
intelligence organization in the 1970s had been members of the Phoenix Program used by 
the United States during Vietnam.223 The Phoenix Program used torture and assassination 
to achieve tactical objectives such as intelligence on the North Vietnamese Army and its 
guerrilla component, the Vietcong. The result was a Salvadoran intelligence agency that 
believed similar tactics could achieve success. 
United States Special Forces were training Salvadorans by 1981, and this training 
included counterinsurgency tactics, patrolling, shooting, soldiering skills, and infantry 
tactics.224 More than 1,000 Salvadoran troops first received training at Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina in 1982. The DoD also set up training areas in Honduras and trained Salvadorans 
in the Panama Canal training areas. An average of 37 U.S. military trainers per month 
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served in El Salvador between November 1982 and September 1983.225 By 1983, nearly 
all Salvadoran officers and half the regular forces had been trained by the United States. 
The United States also began training paramilitary Civil Defense forces in August 1983 to 
supplement ESAF operations.226  
The United States provided similar training to Colombia in the 1980s, but by the 
1990s also modernized Colombian military installations and provided surveillance and 
reconnaissance aircraft as well as crew training.227 United States military aid also helped 
Colombia purchase U.S. Blackhawk and Russian MI-17 helicopters and field Mobile 
Brigades, an Anti-Narcotics Brigade, the Mountain Battalion and the Marine Riverine 
Infantry Brigade. The United States also helped Colombia create a Rapid Deployment 
Force.228 Each of these organizations required training in U.S. tactics and operations that 
matched the mission sets of these types of units. The United States also provided 
counternarcotics aid in the form of military equipment and training. 
Many Salvadoran and Colombian junior enlisted troops were trained in their home 
states, but most officers and senior noncommissioned officers were trained at the U.S. 
Army operated School of the Americas (SOA) campuses in Panama and Fort Benning, 
Georgia. More Salvadorans trained at the SOA than troops from any Latin American state 
during the 1980s, with more than 1100 Salvadoran officers and enlisted training there 
between 1989 and 1990 alone.229 However, Colombia has the most SOA graduates over 
the duration of the school’s existence.230 The School of the Americas was designed to teach 
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Latin American militaries the U.S. way of war, a mixture of tactical proficiency ethics, and 
liberalism. The SOA’s soldiering skills training focused on weapons employment, 
including the infantry assault rifle, grenade launcher, light and heavy machine-guns, and 
mortars, and also included infantry squad through company level combined arms tactics.231 
Communications, call-for-fire, patrolling, and land navigation training was also prominent. 
The SOA taught intelligence collection and analysis, psychological operations, 
interrogation, commando tactics, and sniper techniques.232 Many Salvadorans who trained 
at the SOA indicated in later interviews they were trained in torture techniques for 
interrogations such as electric shock. Intelligence training before 1996 advocated harsh 
tactics including the use of fear, extortion, the use of truth serum, and even suggested that 
execution could be useful in recruiting informants and controlling sources.233 This led to 
the School of the America’s intelligence training manuals being commonly referred to as 
the “Torture Manuals.”234  
One anecdote from an intelligence trainer at the SOA recalled a Salvadoran student 
explaining to the class how well it worked to blindfold detainees, fly them in helicopters 
to disorient them, and then push them out of the helicopter when just a few feet off the 
ground.235 While the Salvadoran claimed this practice would lead to actionable 
intelligence, the SOA instructors found it difficult to emphasize that the U.S. military no 
longer used those techniques and that SOA trainees should not use them either. These same 
manuals are also alleged to have recommended targeting insurgent family members as a 
counterintelligence tactic to gain leverage on informants.236 Many Colombian officers were 
SOA during the time the “Torture Manuals” were part of the curriculum and more than 150 
Colombian SOA graduates have been linked to human rights abuses.”237  
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2. Professional Education 
Several U.S. officials believed that training alongside U.S. troops would socialize 
Salvadoran and Colombian troops to American standards military professionalism.238 
These troops would understand military discipline, the rules of war, the militaries 
relationship to a democratic civilian authority, and the importance of human rights. A 
National Security Council memorandum in February 1983 reported its strategy for El 
Salvador would “Emphasize importance of fostering, through training, improvement in 
ESAF professionalism, to include teaching the relevance of respect for laws and the 
populace; the importance of civic action; and the necessity of a comprehensive campaign 
to provide that security essential for political and economic progress.”239 Training in El 
Salvador needed to include a focus on liberalizing the illiberal and civilizing the uncivilized 
in order to sway the ESAF from human rights abuses.240  
Attendance at the SOA served as the optimal opportunity to socialize trainees, teach 
them the rules of war, and create a preference for human rights through a type of osmosis.241 
Simply put, it was believed trainees would come to exhibit the best characteristics of U.S. 
troops —professionalism, protectors of human rights and the rule of law— through daily 
interaction with the SOA’s U.S. instructors. The SOA was designed to teach ethics and 
liberalism in addition to doctrine and tactics as mentioned above. The SOA emphasized 
human rights training and respect for both the rule of law and the law of war very early in 
its existence. General Wallace Nutting, commander of U.S. Southern Command, in 
October 1980 stressed that SOA training sought “to enhance technical and professional 
skills... including a course titled ‘Human rights aspects in internal defense and 
development.’”242 Two years later, Colonel Nicholas Andreacchio of the SOA claimed that 
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every training course contained “some sort of human rights training.”243 The school 
attempted to “describe military training as an exercise in democracy, engagement, and the 
promotion of human rights.”244 Much of the human rights training emphasized the 
intelligence value of civilians and stressed that killing them did not serve the objective. 
However, most of the SOA training focused on soldiering skills and, at times, this training 
counteracted concerns for human rights.  
Training covered civil-military operations as well, emphasizing that the proper 
military role was in support of civilian authority and civil defense during 
counterinsurgency and counternarcotics operations.245 Much of the civil-military 
operations training focused on humanitarian assistance activities that would provide quality 
of life improvements to achieve civil society support for military operations against 
insurgents. However, the professional education provided included heavy doses of 
anticommunism, which stressed that communists could not be trusted.246 Professional 
education also promoted corporateness, was security-oriented, and promoted professional 
secrecy and served to reinforce themes already inherent in the ESAF and facilitated state-
led repression and violence.247 It could be argued the same themes were present within the 
COLAR as well. 
C. THE EFFECTS OF U.S. TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 
ON SOLDIERING SKILLS, MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM, AND 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND COLOMBIA 
The United States provided extensive military aid to the ESAF and COLAR that 
included training and professionalism and took place both in the United States and in their 
respective countries. This section will explain that both militaries achieved improvements 
in soldiering skills that made them more effective in the use of force. However, 
improvements in military professionalism and democratic civil-military relations were 
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eventually achieved in both militaries but not as a direct result of U.S. military training and 
education.  
The U.S. training and military aid provided to the ESAF increased their soldiering 
skills and made them more lethal, but evidence suggests their respect for human rights 
decreased. Civilian casualties significantly increased after U.S. aid and training increased 
in 1980.248 When asked about U.S. trained Salvadoran troops, the National Federation of 
Salvadoran Workers (FENESTRAS) Union President Gerardo Diaz said: 
It isn’t true, that the soldiers trained in the U.S. go back to El Salvador and 
respect human rights. They come back and become a gang of Salvadoran 
Noriegas . . . We have seen, year after year, U.S. aid used against our people. 
That puts us in a position we don’t want to be in: protesting against U.S. 
citizens. It’s painful for me to think that so few of them are aware of how 
much destruction has occurred in El Salvador because of the money they 
send and soldiers they train.249 
The Truth Commission established at the end of the Salvadoran civil war to 
investigate civil and human rights abuses and to identify and purge from the government 
the perpetrators indicated that 95 percent of violence against noncombatants committed 
during the war was committed by the ESAF.250 The Truth Commission also determined 
“more than two-thirds of the more than sixty officers cited for the worst atrocities in El 
Salvador’s brutal civil war are alumni of the School of the Americas.”251 Benjamin 
Schwarz determined that many of the murders in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
particularly the murders of Jesuit priests, were committed by U.S. trained officers and 
enlisted, alleging their abuses are among the most atrocious.252 Educating troops on human 
rights seems to have been ignored because, like other U.S. supported reforms in El 
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Salvador, it seems to have resulted in more violence.253 As the civil war was ending, the 
ESAF air force bombed neighborhoods with no known combatants and destroyed an 
estimated 30,000 homes.254  
The COLAR’s soldiering skills improved with increases in U.S. military training 
and combat deaths rose more than 60 percent from 1997 to 2001.255 However, civilian 
deaths attributed to the COLAR also increased. Units conducting counterterrorism and 
counternarcotics were indiscriminate in killing and sometimes killed civilians, claiming 
later they were insurgents or narcoterrorists.256 The U.S. DoS 2002 report on Colombia 
acknowledges the COLAR’s “serious abuses, including extrajudicial killings” that are 
rarely brought to justice.257 The report also outlines military support and cooperation with 
paramilitary groups engaged in human rights abuses. 
Professionalism and respect for security under the rule of law has improved at the 
highest levels of the COLAR but frontline troops and even some regimental and regional 
leadership have continued to violate human rights through their cooperation with 
paramilitaries. This has been an attempt to hide human rights abuses similar tactic to the 
ESAF’s use of death squads. The COLAR in some cases assisted paramilitary operations 
actively, but most often passively through roadblocks, disposal of corpses, or by informing 
paramilitaries of planned COLAR attacks.258 The government reported in 2001 that the 
Calima Front in Cali was established and supported by officers in the COLAR Army Third 
Brigade, perhaps even by the brigade commander who was eventually arrested by the 
Attorney General’s Office. Colombian “security agents have engaged in illegal and abusive 
counterinsurgency and counternarcotics tactics, including torture, extrajudicial killings, 
forced disappearances, and the creation and support of illegal paramilitary units.”259 The 
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military is also alleged to have cordoned off the village of Chengue on 17 January 2001 
and even conducted a mock battle with guerrillas to facilitate the massacre of villagers by 
the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).260  
Cooperation and support between the COLAR and the paramilitaries was incredibly 
deadly for combatants and civilians at the end of the 20th Century despite U.S. training and 
education and reforms the U.S. helped Colombia implement. This is likely due to a 
systemic belief that the strategic objective is the elimination of guerrillas and terrorists and 
that paramilitaries are partners in that strategy even if they kill civilians.261 Military 
officials and some in government believed the paramilitary groups were legitimate partners 
in securing the state because they not threaten to overthrow the state, unlike the 
insurgencies and the civilians that are likely supporting them. While the ultra violence was 
abhorrent, their objectives were the same. A former Colombian peace envoy once noted, 
“For our military, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”262 
D. ANALYSIS 
The U.S. military training and professional education provided to the ESAF and the 
COLAR failed to directly improve military professionalism. However, both states did 
eventually achieve more professional militaries and greater democratic civil-military 
relations through different methods and in different timeframes. This section argues that 
institutionalized violence prevented U.S. military professionalism from taking hold and 
that types of regimes and international pressure are significant determinants for reforming 
militaries. 
Evidence indicates human rights abuses and violence were institutionalized in both 
El Salvador and Colombia and prevented improvements in military professionalism despite 
the professional education provided by the United States. Both states used or empowered 
the military to protect the regime and political elite. Both states gave soldiers significant 
policing and judicial powers and protected them from prosecution. Both states also used 
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combat effectiveness as measures of success and as prerequisites for troops to receive 
training in the United States. All of these characteristics promoted violence and 
undermined the rule of law and human rights focus of U.S. professional education 
programs.  
The Salvadoran elite believed in the 1980s that the deaths of thousands was 
necessary to defeat the FMLN and stabilize the country, referring to it as “the necessary 
massacre.”263 The result was state-sanctioned murder, executed by the ESAF, whose 
priority was to support the elite class. The regime facilitated prosecution of the war by 
passing laws such as Code 50 that granted the ESAF and intelligence agencies authorities 
to selectively target suspected insurgents and collaborators and detain them indefinitely 
and without oversight.264 Many were tortured and disappeared. Jose Alberto Madrano—
head of the National Guard, ANSESAL (Agencia Nactional de Servicios Especiales, or 
Salvadoran National Security Agency) and the Democratic Nationalist Organization— 
scoffed at the U.S. Eighth Special Forces Group counterinsurgency emphasis on winning 
hearts and minds and civic action, saying, “In this revolutionary war, the enemy comes 
from our people. . . . They don’t have the rights of Geneva. They are traitors to our country. 
What can the troops do? When they find them, they kill them.”265 Medrano and other 
military leaders accepted that only the elimination of subversive groups would be 
successful.266 When the Salvadoran government was pressured by the Reagan 
administration to improve its human rights record the government in El Salvador promoted 
clandestine death squad operations to achieve its ends.267 The death squads provided an 
opportunity to clandestinely use U.S. trained ESAF troops to prosecute the Salvadoran 
government’s annihilation strategy and attempt to avoid scrutiny over human rights abuses. 
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Colombia’s democracy has largely been dominated by a narrow band of ruling 
elites who have shaped military doctrine to secure their access to power.268 The military 
has been directed to combat all internal threats and has been granted broad control over 
strategy and operations against insurgents.269 The COLAR had operated under an attitude 
in the 1980s that victory should be achieved at any cost and the state attempted to reform 
this attitude, but the “due obedience” immunity clause within the 1991 constitution 
protected junior officers and enlisted from prosecution civilians were killed while they 
were following orders or were in the act of engaging insurgents.270 The Constitutional 
Court did rule in 1997 “that human rights violations such as forcible disappearance, torture, 
murder, and rape could not be considered ‘acts of service’ and should, therefore, be tried 
in the civilian justice system.”271 Evidence suggests the COLAR became more reliant on 
paramilitaries to conduct counterinsurgency when the state attempted military reforms or 
the United States demanded accountability.272 
Combat effectiveness was seen as the primary measure of merit and performance 
in El Salvador and Colombia for selection to the SOA or other training in the United 
States.273 Combat effectiveness was related to enemy body counts. Since attendance at a 
military school in the United States was seen as a chance at social mobility, a chance to get 
promoted, and an opportunity to gain access within the native military and government, 
this policy contributed to more violence. Salvadoran and Colombian troops conducted 
counterinsurgent operations that took no prisoners or would cover-up civilian casualties by 
planting weapons on them to disguise them as guerrillas in order to be considered for 
attendance.274  
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Regime types can promote or obstruct the improvement of military professionalism 
and democratic civil-military relations. What distinguishes Colombia from El Salvador in 
this study is the more democratic nature of the state during the focus period, the long-
standing tradition of civilian control of the COLAR, and the state’s long-term attempts to 
reform the COLAR and professionalize it while attempting to defeat several insurgencies. 
El Salvador was a military dominated autocracy prior to and during the civil war that 
systematically used violence against the FMLN and civilians in its attempts to secure 
victory. Democratic military reform did not fit within that strategic viewpoint. After nearly 
two decades of civil war, El Salvador transitioned to democracy in 1992 and military 
reforms began.275  
Colombia has been a democracy since 1958.276 Civilian control of the military has 
had a strong tradition in Colombia even if it has been fluid and ineffective through much 
of its modern history.277 However, civilian control of the COLAR has not always been 
democratic, complete, or endogenously promoted. The COLAR has openly resisted reform 
at times and the civilian authority has granted the COLAR significant autonomy during 
other times. The Lleras Doctrine of 1958 attempted to depoliticize the military and give it 
autonomy over its structure, equipment, discipline, training, and the conduct of security 
and defense.278 Reform programs have consistently included structural reorganization, 
specialization, and attempts to enforce the rule of law and an appreciation of human rights. 
Civilian authority determines security policy per law, but the COLAR has largely been 
given autonomy to conduct security.279 
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The increasing violence and effectiveness of insurgent and terrorist groups within 
Colombia during the early 1980s convinced the United States and the Colombian 
government that reforming the COLAR was necessary to in order to secure the state. In 
this context, the Belisario Betancur administration (1982-1986), with U.S. assistance, 
attempted security reforms, political reforms, and peace negotiations but the military 
actively resisted them.280 Betancur also directed a reorganization of the COLAR in 1984 
and 1985 with a special emphasis on civil-military actions and the creation of the Elite 
Anti-Guerrilla Force, using professional soldiers.281  
The 1991 constitution democratized civilian control of the COLAR. It established 
the President as the “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces” and made the COLAR 
commanders subordinate.282 Article 216 codified the Military Forces and National Police 
as the state security forces and directed that all citizens be required to serve if directed. 
This was an apparent attempt to build a social contract wherein the COLAR would have a 
responsibility to protect Colombians and the citizens were responsible for protecting 
Colombia. The constitution also directed that professional training and education for the 
COLAR and national police be institutionalized and consistent with a democratic state. The 
first civilian Defense Minister was appointed in 1992 and civilians actively took more 
control of setting security policy. 
President Andres Pastrana Arangoa (1998-2002) wanted to promote human rights 
and establish a legal framework, rules of law, within which the armed forces would operate 
against the insurgents.283 Pastrana, with the help of the United States, restructured troop 
training and promotion programs and developed the “Statute of the Professional Soldier” 
to define “the legal status of military personnel.”284 The COLAR professionalized 
recruiting and officer selection, tripling the number of professional soldiers between 1998 
and 2002. The COLAR added regulares in the same period - “conscripts completing 
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military service of 18 months to two years.”285 The military budget and aid increased under 
the Pastrana regime and the number of combat soldiers doubled between 1998 and 2002.286 
With the support of the United States under the framework of Plan Colombia, 
President Alvaro Uribe Velez continued military reforms when he took office in 2002 but 
extended reforms to other government agencies as well. The Uribe administration sought 
significant military and police reforms, to include changes to military conscription, 
intelligence, and civilian cooperation.287 Uribe created the first national security strategy 
to defeat terrorist logistics and financial systems. He established the Democratic Defense 
and Security Policy between 2002 and 2010 identifying “(a) the protection of the rights of 
all citizens, (b) the protection of democratic values, pluralism and democratic institutions, 
and (c) the solidarity and cooperation of the entire community” as “the pillars of 
Democratic Security.”288 The military passively resisted Uribe’s civil-military relations 
related reforms initially, but U.S. assistance helped mitigate this resistance.289 
Uribe worked with the United States to create more specialized Mobile Brigades 
than had been established during the Pastrana regime.290 Uribe further reduced the number 
of conscripted soldiers, consolidating the previous administration’s gains in increasing the 
professionalism of troops. He created the “peasant soldier” program where conscripted 
troops were garrisoned in their home areas to use them as area experts. The Uribe 
administration also integrated human and technical intelligence with operations planning, 
new tactics, better training, and new equipment to generate more efficient operations that 
resulted in higher attrition of the FARC and other insurgent forces. A democratic regime 
focused on achieving a professionalized military was the key difference to Colombia 
achieving moderate reforms while continuing to fight its insurgencies. Continued reform 
increased the efficiency and effectiveness of the COLAR but deficiencies remained in their 
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professionalism. Another key difference was how subsequent Colombian presidents took 
these actions in concert with U.S. assistance and with the understanding that the failure to 
reform could result in loosing U.S. military and financial support.  
External political and economic pressure may be required in addition to U.S. 
military training and professional education to achieve improvements in military 
professionalism and democratic civil-military relations regardless of the regime type. 
External pressure was essential to generating El Salvador’s reforms. External pressure 
served as an oversight tool to encourage Colombia to continue reforms. 
By the mid-1980s the U.S. Congress was increasingly aware of and appalled by 
human rights abuses allegedly committed by U.S. trained Salvadoran troops. The Congress 
mandated biannual certification that the Salvadoran military was actively working to 
prevent and curtail human rights violations and a failure to prove such proof would result 
in the loss of funding and training.291 Even though the Reagan administration continued to 
approve emergency funding for military training of Salvadoran troops, threats of losing 
U.S. support, international scrutiny, the dogged staying power of the FMLN guerrillas, and 
the political exhaustion caused by more than a decade of civil war led to change in El 
Salvador. Alfredo Cristiani, a leftist, was elected president in 1989 and pledged to 
demobilize the FMLN and decrease the army’s political powers.292  
President Cristiani promoted “the demilitarization of politics.”293 This attempt to 
democratize civil-military relations through the agreement and new constitution achieved 
only modest results. However, civilian control of the ESAF was established when the 
president was designated by the constitution as the commander-in-chief and the National 
Security Council was created.294 The president appoints a military officer as defense 
minister and the joint chiefs of staff have a say in who the defense minister will be, but all 
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defense ministers have been active duty military officers.295 Active duty officers are 
prohibited from being political candidates or serving elected office. The constitution also 
provides the Legislative Assembly some oversight of defense issues, but no significant 
defense budgetary controls. The potential loss of U.S. funding was a factor in getting the 
ESAF leadership to go along with Cristiani’s negotiations and reforms.  
Plan Colombia not only increased U.S. military training and aid, it increased critical 
assessment of the COLAR’s effectiveness. The United States demanded the major military 
reforms beginning in the 1990s because of human rights violations and tactical assessments 
saying the COLAR could not defeat the insurgents without major military reform.296 
Reports from various agencies such as the United Nations during the 2000s increased the 
calls for reform by showing systemic failure in Colombia’s guarantee of protection and 
failures to hold violators accountable.297 The COLAR disbanded the 20th Intelligence 
Brigade for its violations under pressure from the United States and the United States ended 
support to the Air Combat Command No. 1 in 2003 because it failed to investigate a 1998 
civilian casualty incident.298 The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
also collaborated with Colombia to establish a nationwide mass violence or human rights 
early warning system and created a human rights victim assistance program managed by 
the Ministry of the Interior’s General Office for Human Rights. Colombia’s promotion of 
military professionalism and democratic civil-military is unlikely to have achieved these 
moderate successes without pressure and assistance from the United States. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The human rights abuses committed by Colombian and Salvadoran forces trained 
by the U.S. military during the 1980s and 1990s and the challenges in increasing military 
professionalism and democratic civil-military relations in both countries provide a detailed 
case study for military planners and politicians seeking to train foreign forces. The training 
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provided was primarily focused on soldierly skills, but professional education that focused 
on ethics and human rights was incorporated as well. These troops were taught the most 
effective and efficient tactics for conventional war as well as counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism operations. Yet they were also instructed in the rule of law and the Geneva 
Conventions. So why did U.S. trained Salvadoran and Colombian soldiers abuse human 
rights; why did it take so long to reform and professionalize their militaries, and improve 
democratic civil-military relations?  
The ESAF and COLAR institutionalized violence and their governments either 
encouraged it or condoned it. The U.S. standard of military professionalism and its 
approach to the conduct of war did not mesh with how Salvadoran and Colombian troops 
viewed their conflicts or their relationship to their states. For example, one former COLAR 
commander complained that American military doctrine did not apply to their intrastate 
war, saying, “We were using American doctrine, where we conceptualized the continuum 
as ‘war’ and ‘other than war.’ This was absolutely incorrect. There is only war, with the 
enemy fielding different mixes of the elements of war.”299 The insurgencies in both states 
were viewed as struggles for existence. Soldiers feared the lost opportunity of social 
mobility if they reduced the violence and lowered body counts. From these perspectives, it 
is unlikely that any amount of human rights training would be institutionalized without 
home state support. As one SOA spokesman said in 1990, “We place serious emphasis on 
human rights. It’s beyond our control what happens when the Salvadorans go back to their 
country . . . it’s probably inevitable that some of the people we’ve trained here behave in 
less than desirable ways.”300 
The absence of a democratic regime that wanted to reform its military prevented 
professionalization and democratic civil-military relations in El Salvador before the end of 
the civil war in 1992. The resolution of the conflict in El Salvador and the effects of 
consolidating democracy have resulted in reforms. Colombia’s democratic presidents 
sought reform at the encouragement and with the assistance of the United States but were 
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often opposed by the military who feared reforms would limit opportunities for social 
mobility or were pressured to give the military more autonomy when insurgent groups went 
on the offensive or achieved tactical successes.  
The U.S. military aid policies toward El Salvador and Colombia were also 
hypocritical in the sense that they promoted democratic civil-military relations and military 
professionalism but multiple presidential administrations frequently failed to monitor 
human rights violations and implement congressional mandates that prohibited funding 
them. There was a significant imbalance between the funding provided for military aid and 
the funding provided for oversight.301 The Congress mandated that groups found to violate 
human rights would be prohibited from receiving military aid , yet administrations from 
Reagan to George W. Bush skirted this mandate by linking the events in El Salvador and 
Colombia with the Cold War and War on Terror, respectively, declaring them emergency 
military crises. Leftist and terrorist groups in El Salvador and Colombia were identified as 
part of a greater existential threat to U.S. security and the ends —protecting the United 
States— nearly always justified the means. Not holding accountable units accused of 
human rights violations reinforced their actions and aligned tactical actions to strategic 
interests to create a mindset of victory at any cost. Also, U.S. policy makers could claim 
that disengagement from El Salvador and Colombia would remove any leverage the U.S. 
had to push reforms to professionalize the military and democratize civil-military 
relations.302 The United States provided billions of dollars in military aid that included 
equipment and training even when evidence of human rights abuses by these militaries was 
too numerous to deny. However, implementing increased conditionality for aid eventually 
coerced both El Salvador and Colombia to reform. 
Improved military professionalism and democratic civil-military relations 
eventually occurred in both El Salvador and Colombia. Both have codified democratic 
civilian control of the military in their constitutions. The ESAF has also experienced an 
evolution in its roles and missions. While the roles and missions during the late 20th 
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Century were focused on internal security, the ESAF’s post-conflict mission has been more 
focused on external security including participation in a number of international coalitions 
in Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti and the Sudan.303 This shows a maturation in both the 
professionalism of the ESAF and the civilian authority’s understanding of the appropriate 
use of the ESAF.  
Colombia increased the size of the COLAR, its capabilities, and its capacity for 
expanded operations through U.S. assistance.304 The COLAR reformed doctrine, 
leadership, equipment, and strategy. The Ministry of Defense also widely introduced 
human rights and international humanitarian law education.305 The COLAR’s roles and 
missions have not evolved much from internal security but this could change if the 2016 
peace achieved with the FARC can last. Professionalism and democratic civil-military 
relations in Colombia is moving in a positive direction due to a long-term holistic view 
toward reform. 
Using El Salvador and Colombia as a case study shows that U.S. military training 
and professional education alone is limited in its ability to achieve comprehensive 
improvements in military professionalism and democratic civil-military relations in partner 
states. Other factors are required. The receiving states regime must want reform and be 
able to implement it, even though that desire may be inspired by U.S. assistance. The 
training and professional education should be applied across the foreign government 
bureaucracy as well as the military. And finally, the United States must make military aid 
conditional on respecting human rights and enforce it.  
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IV. CASE STUDY: CAMEROON AND SENEGAL 
While military training and professional education programs seek to achieve the 
same objectives in Africa as in Latin America –improved military effectiveness, 
interoperability, increased capacity, and democracy promotion—planners should 
understand modern Africa’s political and military history in relation to its present context 
to best develop working solutions. African colonies were codified in the late 19th Century 
and Sudan was the first to be granted independence in 1956, unlike Latin America, which 
was formally colonized beginning in the 15th Century and achieved independence through 
revolution in the early 19th Century.306 The short timeframe of formal colonial 
administration opened Africa to the global economy, but failed to fully establish modern 
state structures.307 Newly independent rulers inherited state institutions designed for 
indirect rule that relied on patrimonial systems to govern or deliver public goods, and 
alienated the populations furthest from the state capital.308  
The particular type of colonialism and the mostly peaceful decolonization in Africa 
meant the continent skipped the Western state-building process, meaning many of the 
bureaucracies needed to manage the state were underdeveloped.309 The Organization of 
African Unity in 1963 resolved that each African state recognize the others’ borders and 
demanded “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its 
inalienable right to independent existence.”310 Therefore, states did not require their 
militaries to participate in the state building process as described by Tilly, and they do not 
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require the same level of civilian support because social contracts created by the use of 
citizen-soldiers were not part of the state building process.311 If war makes states, African 
states have largely been built on peace.312 
On the other hand, the Cold War also affected Africa differently than it did in Latin 
America and its influence, like that of colonization, also contributed to stunted African 
state-building and democratization.313 The Soviet and Chinese supported insurgencies in 
Latin America occurred in established states more than 100 years removed from their 
colonial masters. By contrast, the Cold War spanned the first and second waves of African 
independence. The activities by Cold War agents in Africa –Soviet and Chinese support to 
leftist insurgencies and U.S. support to anti-communist regimes, often with little concern 
about their interest in democracy—interfered with an endogenous state-building process.314  
The history of colonialism, the Cold War, indirect rule, and personalized rule in 
modern Africa created a collective political culture of neopatrimonialism where the 
military was comfortable as a political actor.315 Military interventions have been a regular 
occurrence and range from regime protection to coups d’état, especially in Western and 
Central Africa where both Cameroon and Senegal are located. The result is a continent 
where state structures and economies are underdeveloped, states struggle to maintain a 
monopoly of force over their territories, and instability and insecurity are significant 
threats. Western and Central Africa, where Cameroon and Senegal are located, are unstable 
and have experienced most of the UN Peace Support Operations since 2004.316 
This chapter will analyze and compare the post-independence political histories of 
Cameroon and Senegal, as well as their militaries, including their roles and missions, and 
                                                 
311 Bachmann, 607. 
312 Herbst, 98. 
313 Martin Rupiya, “Sub-Saharan Africa: Decolonization to Multiparty Democracy and the Challenges 
of Transforming Military Institutions,” in Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to 
Support Democratic Transitions, ed. Dennis C. Blair, (Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 
2013), 193. 
314 Rupiya, 193. 
315 Bachmann, 607. 
316 Bachmann, 608. 
 65 
the status of their civil-military relations. It will also detail current security threats for both 
countries and any training and professional education programs conducted with the United 
States up to the present. This will frame the final chapter’s assessment of the potential 
impacts future U.S. training and professional education programs will have on these and 
other African states.   
A.  BACKGROUND ON CAMEROON AND SENEGAL 
This section reviews the post-independence history of Cameroon and Senegal to 
provide the political and social context within which their armed forces operate and will 
provide a framework for understanding the roles and missions their armed forces perform. 
Cameroon and Senegal gained their independence during the first wave of African 
decolonization in the early 1960s. Both had been French colonies, although the 
northwestern region of Cameroon was once part of the British colony of Nigeria. Both 
adopted single-party dominated governments post-independence that used cooptation and 
patrimonialism to function. The 1990s democratization wave inspired liberalization 
movements in both Senegal and Cameroon, but achieved different outcomes.317 Senegal 
has liberalized and become a multiparty democracy, while liberalization attempts in 
Cameroon have largely failed.318 Both economies are primary products-based, and 
Cameroon has been an oil exporter since the late 1970s.319 Both state economies are 
developing but small, with Cameroon ranked as the world’s 95th largest economy by gross 
domestic product and Senegal ranked as the 116th.320  
Modern Cameroon was created when French Cameroon gained its independence in 
1960 followed by the merger with British Cameroon upon its independence in 1961. The 
colony of Kamerun was partitioned by France and Britain after Germany’s defeat in WWI, 
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with what is now called the Anglophone region becoming part of British Cameroon.321 
Cameroon is ethnically heterogenous but has two distinct colonially imposed linguistic 
groups speaking English and French.322 Anglophones make up 20 percent of Cameroon’s 
population.323 While Cameroon’s independence was gained without revolution, its modern 
creation was not without violence. The Union des Populations du Cameroun, an 
independence group with communist political tendencies that did not receive funding or 
arms from the Eastern Block, fought against French colonial forces from 1948 through 
independence.324 Cameroon became a federated republic with a multiparty system in 1961 
with Amadou Ahidjo as president.325 Due to the ongoing insurgency by UPC, President 
Ahidjo legislated a one-party system in 1966, under the Union National Camerounien 
(UNC) party, believing that this was the only way to create national unity. Ahidjo worked 
to fracture the UPC and Anglophone political party alliances and bring them into the UNC 
fold.326 Those parties that did not join UNC were kept out of government when the 
multiparty federation was absolved in 1972 (creating a unitary system). The current 
Anglophone separatist movement is a result of the failure of the 1972 decision to build the 
national unity that Ahidjo desired.  
Paul Biya assumed the presidency in 1982 when Ahidjo resigned due to poor 
health.327 Biya spent the early years of his presidency appointing co-ethnics and regional 
leaders to ministerial, legislative, and state-owned businesses based on personal loyalty. 
Liberalization movements during the 1990s resulted in a multiparty election and 
established presidential term limits, but opposition parties failed to win the presidency in 
1992. Biya’s response was to introduce and receive approval of an amendment to the 1996 
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constitution that identifies the president as “the symbol of national unity,”328 thereby 
implying that opposition to the president is opposition to national unity. Single-party 
dominance along with co-ethnic parliamentarians and judges also facilitated Biya’s 
removal of constitutional term limits in 2008 and the reversal of the 1990s liberal 
reforms.329 This democratic regression resulted in mass protests that were violently 
repressed by the co-ethnic military. Biya won his sixth term in 2011 with 78 percent of the 
vote.330 Biya is planning to run for another term as president in 2018.331 
Cameroon’s political system has been designated a hybrid regime or a competitive 
authoritarian regime.332 These are described as democracies that allow elections and other 
democratic governance protocols, but manipulate them and restrict freedom while 
segregating or repressing some groups. Mass protest and liberalization movements are 
significant actions for achieving democratic reforms if the military does not support the 
ruler.333 Herein may lie one key factor in Cameroon’s inability to achieve liberal 
democracy. Biya, like his predecessor, has been successful in factionalizing the military 
and political elites.334 This is a common outcome in hybrid regimes. Biya’s has ample 
support in the government and does not have to rely on democratic support because the 
military, legislature, and judiciary are filled with co-ethnics or political partisans. Oil rents 
may also allow Cameroon to rely less on democratic institutions because oil rents allow 
rulers to depend less on foreign aid and state taxes and this can reduce their respect for the 
rule of law and the need to develop a social contract with its citizens.335 
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Senegal also gained its independence from France in 1960. Senegal has been mostly 
peaceful since independence except for the insurgency in the Casamance region that began 
in 1982.336 The Senegalese favor debate and consensus, even in politics, and t civil society 
is strong, including the National Association of Traditional Communicators that promotes 
peace among Senegalese. This helps explain the absence of significant religious conflicts 
in a population that is 90 percent Muslim and which had a Christian serve as the first 
president. Senegal’s human rights and freedom of the press ratings are also some of the 
highest in the region.337 This has been achieved despite single party rule for much of 
Senegal’s post-independence history. 
Leopold Sedar Senghor was the first president of Senegal from 1960 until 1981 
when his handpicked successor, Abdou Diouf, assumed the office. Diouf was elected to 
two five-year terms until 1993, when he reformed the constitution to allow a seven-year 
presidential term.338 Senegal allowed limited regional self-governance after independence, 
which established some democratic institutions early on prior to 2000; however, single-
party rulers in Senegal stacked co-ethnics in cabinet and judiciary positions and used 
agricultural subsidies to build loyal voter blocks throughout the state.339 Co-ethnic stacking 
and co-optation of local authorities resulted in voter fraud and election violence during the 
1980s and 1990s.340 Economic crises in the 1980s restricted political patronage and 
opposition movements developed that eventually degraded the Socialist Party’s grip on 
power.341 The first free and fair democratic transition transpired when Diouf’s challenger, 
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Parti Democratique Senegalais candidate Abdoulaye Wade, won the 1999 election and 
assumed the presidency in 2000.342  
Despite the democratic election in 1999, concerns about democratic regression 
began early in Wade’s first term.343 Wade tried throughout his presidency to concentrate 
power and succeeded in placing loyalists and relatives in the judiciary and ministerial 
jobs.344 The DoS believed governance and transparency regressed under Wade.345 A DoS 
report published in 2012 alleges deficiencies in the independence of the judiciary and 
suggests increases occurred in security force abuses of human rights, including physical 
abuse and torture, gender harassment, and violence toward the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and 
Transgender community.346 Human Rights Watch also reported violations by the police. 
Wade also stacked co-ethnics in the judiciary and successfully lobbied the legislature to 
change the constitution to allow a third term.347 However, when political protest erupted 
during the elections over diverging interpretations of the constitution, the military refused 
to intervene at the behest of Wade and he lost the election to opposition leader Macky 
Sall.348 
The 2012 election served as the third peaceful transition of power in Senegal since 
1981 and the second democratic transition in a row, qualifying Senegal as a consolidated 
democracy.349 In addition to democratic presidential elections, Senegal boasts a multi-
party, popularly elected National Assembly and normally achieves more than 50 percent 
voter turnout in elections.350 President Sall seems intent on further consolidating 
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democracy and has abolished the Senate, which Wade had created and in which 65 percent 
of senators were appointed by the president.351 Sall has also pledged support to a 
constitutional amendment for presidential term limits of two five-year terms and has 
regularly ordered investigations into political corruption. 
Both Cameroon and Senegal began as one-party states, but only Senegal 
transitioned to a consolidated democracy. In fact, Senegal is one of only a handful of 
African states that have achieved multiple peaceful democratic transitions.352 While 
Senegal has flirted with democratic backsliding since 2000, it shows signs of continuing 
its democratic consolidation. Meanwhile, Cameroon has held multi-party elections, but 
remains under the single-party rule of Paul Biya.353 Furthermore, unlike Senegalese ruling 
parties, in Cameroon, Biya has used co-optation to cement competitive authoritarianism.354 
The next section will review how the political and social context of Cameroon and Senegal 
impacts the roles and missions of their respective armed forces.  
B. THE ARMED FORCES OF CAMEROON AND SENEGAL 
The structure, roles, and missions of African militaries, like many African political 
institutions, often transferred directly from the colonial experience. Some newly 
independent armies consisted of soldiers from the former colonial master and other 
foreigners.355 In many cases, colonial militaries were designed to protect the state from the 
people instead of being tasked to protect African citizens.356 The AU agreement to keep 
colonial borders prevented interstate wars and land grabs, and, therefore, helped sustain 
military roles and missions that often focused on dynamics internal to the new states: 
indirect, personal rule through coercive force.  
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The Cameroon and Senegalese armed forces share many similarities despite the 
differences regime type. They are similar in size. Cameroon has 14,400 active duty military 
for population of almost 25 million, or one soldier for every 1600 people.357 Senegal has 
13,600 active duty military for population of 14.6 million, or one soldier for every 1073 
people.358 Both militaries are all-volunteer forces.359 Both are members of regional security 
cooperatives. Cameroon participates in the Multinational Joint Task Force countering 
Boko Haram, is a partner with the Central African Multinational Force (CAMF), and has 
sent experts to participate in the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo.360 Senegal is an active member of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and has participated in multiple UN and African Union missions.361  
Both militaries are tasked with external security. Cameroon’s focus is along the 
Bakassi Peninsula, the Central African Republic border, and the Chadian border.362 
Senegal’s external security focus is on its borders with the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and 
Mali.363 Both armed forces are tasked with counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and 
countertrafficking missions. Cameroon is also tasked to perform antipoaching missions in 
its northeastern region.364 Both states have small navies. Cameroon’s naval mission is to 
serve as a riverine and coastal patrol force with the additional mission of protecting 
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offshore oil rigs.365 The Senegalese Navy performs coast guard functions, fights maritime 
pollution, and enforces maritime environmental regulations.366 
There are also several key differences between the two militaries. While Cameroon 
and Senegal have an army, air force, navy, and gendarmerie, Cameroon’s armed forces 
include specialized Rapid Intervention Battalions, a Presidential Guard, and Firefighters.367 
The Senegalese military works on national development projects, including building roads 
and bridges.368 The army has been tasked at times to help get crops to market, which 
required building or improving roads, drilling wells, building wharves and airfields.369 The 
Senegalese military also builds firebreaks, fights fires, and conducts reforestation 
programs.370 Senegal also tasks its military to provide medical services to the civilian 
population and Senegalese military hospitals and clinics provide 80 percent of the medical 
care in the country.371 
Another key difference is in the demographics of the military. Many African states 
maintain militaries built around a core ethnic or tribal group.372 Evidence suggests the 
Cameroon armed forces are largely co-ethnics of President Biya.373 However, there is also 
evidence that careful consideration is made to co-opt troops from different ethnicities and 
regions through key military leadership appointments.374 On the contrary, Senegalese law 
allows all ethnicities and religions to join the military and the military is fully desegregated 
down to the unit level.375 
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A significant divergence occurs in how Cameroon’s and Senegal’s militaries are 
tasked to conduct internal security. Both have gendarmerie forces that provide policing and 
internal security functions. Cameroon’s military, however, is regularly used to repress 
civilian protest of the government as a form of maintaining public safety. The result is often 
violent, as it was during the youth protests of 2008, and implies the function of internal 
security is primarily regime security.376 Senegal’s armed forces are used to supplement the 
gendarmerie and local police during crises of public safety but they are not ordered to 
repress peaceful civilian protest. As mentioned previously, the Senegalese military chose 
not to help Wade remain in office when he lost the 2012 election.    
The Cameroon and Senegalese armed forces are both assessed to be professional in 
soldering skills. Both have codified joint and combined arms doctrine and regularly execute 
them in exercises and operations.377 Senegal developed doctrine, administration, and 
military judicial regulations not long after independence, which promoted 
professionalism.378 Cameroon operates specialized forces, such as the Rapid Intervention 
Battalions that have shown some success against paramilitary units and provide a flexible 
combined arms reaction force capacity.379 Senegal’s armed forces have earned a reputation 
as a highly educated and skilled military with specialized training and are regularly asked 
by the UN and AU to participate in peacekeeping and other operations.380 In fact, Senegal 
has participated in more than 20 missions globally and deployed more than 33,000 
troops.381 Cameroon’s participation in CAMF is notable, but it has not provided any 
significant elements to international peacekeeping, even if that is an objective for the 
state.382  
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Assessing the soldier-state professionalism of the Cameroon and Senegalese armed 
forces is more challenging. Both states recognize the importance of education generally 
and military professional education specifically. Cameroon requires a high school diploma 
for enlistment.383 Cameroon also requires all of its officers to complete the Joint Forces 
Military Academy.384 Enlistment requirements are difficult to ascertain, but the Senegalese 
military has always sought well-educated recruits that represent Senegalese society.385 
Senegal also operates a military school, Ecole Militaire of Saint Louis, and also has 
university level programs at the Ecole Polytechnique de Thies and the Ecole de Sante 
Militaire de Dakar.386 The former trains civilian engineers as well as military engineers. 
Additionally, Senegal officer and noncommissioned officer schools require competitive 
entrance exams.387 Senegal also has a strong military administration that includes annual 
performance evaluations, rigid and independent promotion nominations processes.388 
Recruiting better educated soldiers and competitive selection for military schools gives the 
impression that the Senegalese military is considered a profession instead of an occupation, 
and specifically that it is not perceived as an “employer of last resort.”389 The same could 
be inferred for Cameroon. However, there are indicators that the militaries are not equal in 
their levels of soldier-state professionalism. 
Indicators of a divergence in soldier-state professionalism in Cameroon and 
Senegal can be found using three measures of effectiveness: leadership participation with 
peacekeeping operations, levels of corruption, and shirking. Senegal officers have served 
as UN peacekeeping mission force commanders on numerous occasions.390 While 
Cameroon has provided subject matter experts to international missions, there is no 
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evidence Cameroon officers have been assigned to leadership roles in international 
missions. This discrepancy may be the result of the significant oversight and scrutiny 
peacekeeping missions receive, particularly their focus on enforcing the international law 
of war, and concerns the UN and AU may have regarding the Cameroonian government’s 
use of the military to repress civilian protest. A cursory review of mass media reports since 
the October 2017 declaration of an independence by Anglophone separatists shows military 
repression of civic protest is increasing in both frequency and violence. Corruption is also 
a significant concern in Cameroon but less so in Senegal. Emile Ouedraogo measures 
corruption in Defense Sector Financial and Administrative Affairs and finds that Cameroon 
scores a 0 (low transparency) in all but five categories, and those score no higher than a 2 
out of 4.391 For example, Cameroon’s Defense Minister was charged in 2010 with 
embezzling operations and acquisitions funds from the military between 2004 and 2009.392 
Ouedraogo does not grade Senegal, but Transparency International grades both, ranking 
Cameroon as the 153rd most corrupt state in the world and Senegal the 66th.393 Therefore, 
it can be inferred that Senegal’s armed forces are considerably less corrupt than 
Cameroon’s, especially considering Sall’s anti-corruption investigations. Finally, 
Cameroon soldiers have allegedly shirked their duties during the recent Anglophone crisis 
when some soldiers were reported to be among the refugees fleeing to Nigeria.394 
Cameroon and Senegal appear to have mostly effective militaries. Their militaries 
also appear to be professional based on the soldierly skills model. However, the roles and 
missions of the militaries diverge in that, although Cameroon is fighting violent extremist 
organizations and separatist insurgents, a frequent application of the Cameroon armed 
forces’ internal security role is to repress political opponents and civil protest. On the other 
hand, Senegal uses the armed forces to supplement policing but does not direct them 
against political opponents or repress civil protest. The different applications for internal 
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security appears to be result of their different political systems. Cameroon is most 
concerned about regime security while Senegal is concerned with providing security as a 
public good. Soldier-state professionalism also appears to be different in both states and 
may also be a result of different political context. The next section explores the current 
state of civil-military relations in both states. 
C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN CAMEROON AND SENEGAL 
The history of colonialism, indirect rule, coercive force, and patrimonialism has 
created a collective political culture that makes the transition to democratic civil military 
relations challenging for African states.395 Many African militaries remained influenced by 
former colonial powers after independence and it impaired democratic transition.396 
Armies were often built around tribal affiliation, especially those tribes with warrior 
cultures.397 The transition to democratic civil-military relations in francophone Africa, 
specifically, has been difficult because personal loyalty to the president has been a driving 
force within the political culture.398 Therefore, most African militaries have been politically 
involved in their state at some point regardless of their path to independence.399 
Cameroon’s civil-military relations follows this logic while Senegal’s does not.  
Both states have strong civilian control of the military. Cameroon’s president has 
direct control over the armed forces and the Presidential Guard and Rapid Intervention 
Battalion are subordinate only to President Biya.400 However, Cameroon’s civilian control 
does not include the parliament, which has no military oversight roles.401 Senegal has a 
mature and broad civilian management structure with considerable oversight.402 The 
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Senegalese president is the commander in chief.403 The Senegalese parliament passes laws 
regarding the military and approves its budget. The Senegalese Ministry of the Armed 
Forces is the civilian bureaucracy that supervises the military and is advised by the chief 
of defense staff and gendarmerie commander. The Ministry also sets roles, missions, and 
strategy with advice from military staff and civilian advisors.  
Coups are relatively rare in both countries, and those that have occurred, have not 
succeeded. This fact on its own establishes Cameroon and Senegal as anomalies in Western 
and Central Africa, two of the most coup-prone regions in the world. Cameroon had failed 
coups in 1983 and 1984.404 Cameroon’s first president had appointed northern co-ethnics 
(Muslim Fulani and Peuhl) to the military, parliament, judiciary, and ministries. When Biya 
took over in 1982, he did the same, which required a shift to his co-ethnics from his home 
territory in the south (Christian Bulu).405 The army attempted the coups when Biya 
announced intentions to appoint co-ethnics, but the coups failed and northerners were 
purged. Senegal has also not experienced a successful coup since independence.406 
Senegal’s first Prime Minister Mamadou Dia had been planning a military coup to 
overthrow President Senghor in 1962, but his plan was discovered and he was arrested 
before it could be conducted.   
Strong civilian control and the absence of coups do not mean both militaries are 
apolitical. Cameroon’s military has intervened on behalf of the president during mass 
protests as mentioned above and has been ordered to deploy to opposition strongholds 
throughout the country during presidential elections.407 This is likely because co-ethnic and 
co-opted militaries tend to be loyal to the president.408 Initially, the Senegalese military 
assumed an apolitical posture, and soldiers were not allowed to vote until 2007.409 
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However, the military has been diverse since Senegal’s first president, Leopold Senghor, 
promoted ethnic diversity and Senegalese nationalism, and the military has been more loyal 
to the rule of law than to political patrons.410 There have been political tensions and periods 
of democratic regression in Senegal since independence, but the military has never 
intervened via a coup.411 The Senegalese military has defected from the ruler in cases where 
ruler decisions run counter to the constitution.412 The 2012 election is a good example of 
the Senegalese military’s allegiance to democratic principles vice showing a penchant for 
supporting the personal rule of a sitting president. On the contrary, the Cameroon military 
has supported the president when he has attempted to change the constitution. Therefore, 
the type of civilian control is different and results in the Cameroon military’s political 
orientation while the Senegalese military remains apolitical. 
Another significant difference between civil-military relations in Cameroon and 
Senegal is the relationship between the military and society. Significant tension and 
mistrust exists in the former and not the latter. Cameroon’s principle of popular defense, 
wherein all citizens are expected to come to the nation’s defense, should help build a sense 
of nationalism and camaraderie with the military but it does not.413 This is likely caused by 
the frequent use of the military to quell liberal reforms. Widespread civil resistance 
occurred after the end of the Cold War seeking democratic transition, particularly 
multiparty elections, but Biya used the co-ethnic military to repress demonstrators and 
intimidate opposition politicians.414 The military and police are also alleged to have killed 
more than 100 civilians during the February 2008 youth protests. Amnesty International 
claims Cameroon has committed significant human rights violations, “including with 
arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detention, enforced disappearances, torture and deaths in 
custody,” under the guise of its operations against Boko Haram.415 They documented at 
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least 101 individual cases of human rights violations, some of which resulted in torture and 
murder by the Cameroon security forces, including regular army, police, and Rapid 
Intervention Battalion.416 All documented victims, some of whom were women and 
children, were accused of supporting Boko Haram but little evidence was provided to 
justify the claims. These incidents show a distinct fissure between the average Cameroon 
citizen and the military. 
Senegal’s military, unlike Cameroon’s, is well respected by Senegalese society. 
This is largely due to programs developed by the government to integrate the military into 
state and nation building projects. President Senghor wanted to build a Senegalese state 
and his second chief of defense, General Diallo, wanted to develop Senegalese 
infrastructure.417 They both felt the military could build roads, bridges, and other projects. 
The program, called Armee-Nation, builds a strong bond between the military and society 
in Senegal.418 The Armee-Nation concept mobilizes the military to work on urgent 
development needs neither the public nor private sector can fulfil and the military’s role 
can be complimentary to public and private roles.419 It provides avenues for civil-military 
interaction and collaboration that serves as a school for the nation.  
Other programs also promote goodwill between the Senegalese military and 
civilians. The use of military physicians in rural areas has improved quality of life and 
raised the reputation of the military among civilians.420 A Senegalese military officer is 
director of the National Civic Service.421 This youth-focused program teaches young men 
and women democratic values and the importance of nation building through work 
programs with government ministries, schools, nongovernmental organizations, and 
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schools.422 Additionally, the Senegalese army has weekly radio broadcasts and three 
publications that provide outreach and public relations. The Senegalese media are also 
invited to a military media boot camp program and the media host programs for the 
military, resulting in a favorable and respectful working relationship. Finally, Senegalese 
military bases are open to the public, including the use of military facilities for public social 
events. All of these initiatives build a strong bond between the Senegalese military and 
society but Cameroon appears to have no similar programs to achieve the same result. 
The current status of civil-military relations in Cameroon and Senegal are 
considerably different. While both have strong civilian control of the military, only 
Senegal’s civil-military relations can be qualified as democratic. Cameroon’s armed forces 
are political and partisan, regularly intervening on behalf of the president against his 
opponents and to quell civil protest. Senegal’s military has purposefully stayed out of 
politics. The Cameroon armed forces have been accused of human rights violations 
throughout Biya’s presidency resulting in a significant fissure between the military and 
society, whereas, the Senegalese military has been used to promote economic development, 
human development, and Senegalese nationalism to achieve a positive relationship with 
society. The nature of each state’s politics is the likely cause of this divergence in civil-
military relations.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Cameroon and Senegal both face several security concerns that drive U.S. interest 
in training and educating their militaries in order to achieve stability within the region. 
Organized crime, smuggling, and violent extremist activity in Mali are a security concern 
for Senegal’s eastern territory.423 Regional democratic regression, such as in Mali, is 
another threat to Senegal.424 The 36-year-old insurgency in Casamance has improved in 
the last decade but remains Senegal’s greatest internal security challenge and a manpower 
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burden.425 Also, significant drug and human trafficking through Senegal is estimated at 
eight times higher than GDP. Similarly, Cameroon is stressed by security risks on four 
fronts. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta insurgents operate in the 
Bakassi Peninsula.426 Boko Haram has killed at least 1,500 Cameroon civilians and caused 
more than 223,000 refugees to flee northern Cameroon since 2014.427 The Anglophone 
separatist movement declared the Republic of Ambazonia on 1 October 2017 and has since 
been fighting a small-scale guerrilla campaign against Cameroon security forces, raided 
government positions, and the violence has caused more than 20,000 refugees to flee to 
Nigeria.428 Crime and violence also continue to plague Cameroon’s border with Central 
African Republic. Any of these security concerns could jeopardize either state’s stability.   
Effectiveness and soldiering skills professionalism make the Cameroon and 
Senegalese militaries well-qualified prospects for U.S. military training and professional 
education in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives in the region. But how will these 
U.S. programs impact their civil-military relations? Can U.S. training and professional 
education encourage democratization of Cameroon’s civil-military relations or just provide 
President Biya with more lethal forces that can intervene on his behalf? Can U.S. training 
and professional education deepen Senegal’s democratic civil-military relations or prevent 
democratic regression? The next chapter will review previous military training and 
professional education programs both states have conducted with the United States and 
analyze current and future programs to answer these questions and provide a general 
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V. ASSESSMENT AND IMPLICATIONS 
Cameroon and Senegal conduct counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, 
peacekeeping, and maritime security operations that align with U.S. national strategic 
objectives in Africa and U.S. security cooperation and security assistance programs there. 
Cameroon received $4.7 million in U.S. military training and assistance in 2016 for 
equipment, training, and professional education, including funds for 47 students attending 
resident professional education programs in the United States and other locations. Funding 
in 2017 was $1.1 million.429 Senegal received $3.3 million in 2016, including funds for 63 
students in resident programs. That amount dropped to just under $1 million in 2017.430 
The DoS highlighted “military professionalism, maritime and transnational threats, border 
security and transnational threats, adherence to norms of human rights, and civilian control 
of the military” as the primary objectives for Cameroon’s assistance programs.431 Senegal’s 
program highlights consisted of “military professionalism, peacekeeping, border security 
and transnational threats, adherence to norms of human rights, civilian control of military, 
maritime security and transnational threats.”432 
This chapter outlines the military training and professional education the United 
States currently conducts with Cameroon and Senegal. It defines the Marine Corps’ 
concept of a professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps and discusses the likely 
means through which MARFORAFRICOM will incorporate these concepts into future 
training for Cameroon and Senegal. Finally, it will assess the training and professional 
education program’s prospects for success in each state, determine the validity of the 
hypotheses presented in the Chapter I and analyze those findings, and identify potential 
trap-falls and implications for the rest of Africa.  
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A. U.S. MILITARY TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 
PROGRAMS IN CAMEROON AND SENEGAL 
Training and professional education programs in Cameroon and Senegal seek to 
build their tactical and technical capabilities, improve their interoperability with U.S. 
forces and other security partners, and enhance their capacity to conduct operations 
independently in order to counter narcotics and human trafficking, violent extremist 
organizations, and piracy, while fostering stability, good governance, and economic 
development. These programs range from multilateral exercises to small-group senior 
leader engagements and resident education programs in the United States and other 
locations. United States military services typically conduct these programs with similarly 
designed military and security forces in partner states. Marine Corps training programs are 
typically designed to increase interoperability and build capabilities and capacity with 
partner state amphibious forces or naval infantry.  
Military training, including multilateral exercises, focus on the soldiering skills 
model of professionalism. Multilateral exercises often cover a broad scope of soldiering 
skills including command and control of large and small units, platoon-level fire and 
maneuver, and individual combat skills. Smaller, bilateral exercises and engagements tend 
to focus on individual, team, and platoon tactics, techniques, and procedures. Professional 
education will focus on the soldier-state model of professionalism, although many of its 
elements –leadership, ethics, and decisiveness—also impact the soldiering skills model. 
Some programs combine the soldiering skills and soldier-state models into medium-term 
and long-term residential education curriculum. Regional Centers, the U.S. Service 
Academies, The Basic School, and graduate education programs are examples that focus 
heavily on both the soldiering skills and soldier-state models.  
1. Military Training: The Soldiering Skills Model 
Cameroon and Senegal participate in several regional, multilateral, and bilateral 
exercises and engagements managed by the United States. Some exercises and 
engagements are one-time events. Others feed into exercise cycles that seek to achieve 
 85 
incremental improvements each year. The following provide examples of each going back 
to 2011.  
African Partnership Station 2011 partnered Senegalese Marine Commandos with 
U.S. Marines to learn movement to contact techniques.433 African Partnership Station 
serves as an ideas and tactics, techniques, and procedures exchange between the U.S. 
military and the Senegalese armed forces.434 Some of the Senegalese NCOs were 
experienced in the techniques and served as instructors.435 A Senegalese Staff Sergeant 
served as a chief instructor of the training.436 The Senegalese also taught the Marines 
Senegalese techniques for fighting in their environment as well as survival skills.   
Cameroon Naval Commandos in March 2015 trained with U.S. Marines on small-
boat operations, search and seizure techniques, basic infantry skills, and marksmanship.437 
The engagement included classroom instruction, weapons safety, and live-fire training. 
The previous year, the Marines exercised with the Cameroon Naval Commando Company 
to teach small-boat operations, marksmanship, patrolling, and NCO leadership.438 These 
training events sought to build the Naval Commandos’ capability and capacity to secure 
Cameroon’s maritime border through riverine operations and patrolling. Riverine 
operations training focused on safe weapons use from boats to help them maximize 
firepower. Infantry tactics and NCO leadership were also significant aspects of the training, 
as were counter-narcotics and human trafficking. The NCO leadership training focused on 
teaching the NCOs how to conduct and teach the training during future iterations.439 The 
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final training event evaluated the Cameroon commandos on insertion, extraction, boat 
formations, and shore-based patrolling. 
In 2016, the Marines trained officers and noncommissioned officers from the 
Senegal Compagnie Fusilier de Marine Commando. The focus was on combat firing 
techniques that included weapons live-fire ranges and culminated with a platoon attack.440 
The training served as a train-the-trainer event, wherein the Senegalese leaders are 
expected to train their units in the future. Another training goal was to build relationships 
between U.S. Marines and Senegalese troops to enhance their ability to operate together in 
the future. 
The Marines also conducted a theater security cooperation exercise on 
peacekeeping in 2017 that sought to improve Senegalese capacity for deployment 
throughout the continent to perform UN peacekeeping missions.441 The peacekeeping 
training included counter improvised explosive device training, urban combat training, 
convoy operations, patrolling, and small and medium weapons training. Senegalese 
proficiency was assessed during a culminating event.  
Cameroon and Senegal participated in Exercise Obangame Express 2018 to 
enhance capabilities and interoperability in maritime security and safety in the Gulf of 
Guinea.442 The strategic objective of Obangame Express is to improve law enforcement 
capacity and build the planning and execution capabilities and interoperability of the 
African maritime law enforcement partnership within the Gulf of Guinea.443 Obangame 
Express was also “designed to improve regional cooperation, maritime domain awareness, 
information-sharing practices, and tactical interdiction expertise to enhance the collective 
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capabilities of Gulf of Guinea and West African nations to counter sea-based illicit 
activity.”444 The event included a U.S. Navy-Marine Corps led tabletop exercise to enhance 
interagency communication and coordination between African partners and the United 
States.445 Vessel boarding techniques, medical response and evacuation, communications, 
search and rescue, and information management were unit level skillsets that were also 
rehearsed during Obangame Express. 
Another major annual exercise is Flintlock. It involves more than 30 militaries and 
seeks to develop relationships, build interoperability between African, European and 
United States forces, and improve skills.446 Flintlock helps to serve as a culminating 
exercise that assesses skills rehearsed in numerous exercises and engagements conducted 
throughout the year.447 Senegal hosted Flintlock 2016. In that exercise, the Senegalese 
Army, with the help of the U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa, planned and 
executed combined-joint logistics for five different geographic locations, including mess 
halls, with organic resources.448 Each example above demonstrates the primacy of 
soldiering skills during exercises.  
2. Professional Education: The Soldier-State Model  
Professional education focuses on the soldier-state model of professionalism even 
if many of the skillsets it develops are applicable to soldiering skills. Many of the regional 
multilateral exercises noted above incorporate senior or key leader engagements to provide 
professional education. These engagements can include senior officers and/or senior 
enlisted personnel. The formats typically include classroom instruction, guided discussion, 
and focus groups on ethics, decision-making, leadership, and governance. These topics 
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may be scenario driven. Professional education can be provided by U.S. military personnel 
but is often supplemented by civilian and contracted instructors from organizations such as 
the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Civil-Military Relations. Professional 
education also includes resident attendance at courses in the United States and other allied 
nations funded through the IMET program.    
Specific fiscal year 2016 professional education programs in Cameroon included 
counterterrorism executive seminars, the legal aspects of counterterrorism, and human 
rights.449 Cameroon troops attended courses and seminars in the United States and 
elsewhere on how to reintegrate ex-combatants, Security Risks of Refugees and Displaced 
Persons, Civilian Police Training, Gender Protection, and Protection of Civilians. 
Cameroon officers also attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 
preparatory course, the U.S. Army Basic Infantry Officer Course, the U.S. Army Maneuver 
Captains Career Course, the Naval Staff College, and Professional Military Education 
Preparatory School.  
Specific fiscal year 2016 professional education programs in Senegal included 
Civil-Military Response to Terrorism and Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Relief.450 
Senegalese officers attended the U.S. Army Armor Basic Officer, the U.S. Army War 
College, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officers Course, International 
Fellows Orientation, International Officers School, the Naval Command College, and the 
Naval Staff College. Senegal also sends some officers to the Marine Corps’ The Basic 
School.451 Each of these programs contain dozens of hours of instruction to enhance the 
overall professionalism of the individual soldier.  
3. Professionalizing the NCO Corps: A Combination of the Two Models 
The professionalization of Cameroonian and Senegalese NCO corps was a specific 
objective of MARFORAFRICOM and the genesis of this thesis. To achieve this 
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MARFORAFRICOM will develop a curriculum and incorporate it into exercises and 
engagements. They may also use the IMET program to send NCOs to resident enlisted 
courses in the United States. The range of topics will vary, but primary instruction will 
consist of applicable warfighting functions and leadership. Programs will include a one-
year training cycle broken into two to three modules. Each module will contain programs 
of instruction lasting two to three weeks each. Below is a description of the Marine Corps’ 
concept of a professional NCO corps.  
The U.S. Marine Corps views the NCO corps as its foundation for excellent 
performance of roles and missions and this belief is the impetus for replicating this concept 
within partner state militaries.452 Noncommissioned officers provide the order and 
discipline of a unit and this has been a hallmark of Western military professionalism since 
at least the 18th Century.453 They are leaders, and professionalized military organizations 
have advancement mechanisms based on merit and evaluation of professional and technical 
performance that shape those leaders as they progress through the ranks.454 The result is an 
NCO who bridges the gap between officers and junior enlisted, maintains discipline, and 
operates in the absence of clear orders.  
Noncommissioned officers feel duty bound to perform all of their roles and 
missions to the best of their ability, and to inspire their subordinates to do the same.455 They 
are responsible for following and issuing appropriate orders, which are orders that are not 
only commensurate with the capabilities and skills of their organization, but are also legal, 
moral, and correct for the situation. They should have superior knowledge and technical 
experience compared to their subordinates.456 Noncommissioned officers, as the bridge 
between officers and junior enlisted, are responsible for training and educating their 
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subordinates in order to prepare them to effectively and efficiently execute their roles and 
missions.457 
Noncommissioned officers must have the capacity to act independently, based on 
an understanding of their officer’s intent and based on their own personal knowledge, 
proficiency, and understanding of the situation.458 The NCO must demonstrate knowledge, 
initiative, and decisiveness in order to execute a fundamental aspect of Marine Corps 
leadership, the mission-type order or mission tactics. This is the process of “assigning a 
subordinate mission without specifying how the mission must be accomplished.” In 
mission tactics, the subordinate leader, in this case the NCO, determines the best way to 
execute the task.459 This requires the NCO to use their imagination to achieve their missions 
and objectives. This encourages adaptation and innovation and NCOs must know their 
officers and other leaders well enough to anticipate their decisions and have their units 
ready to execute their roles and missions.460 
Professional NCOs are ambassadors and representatives of their organizations and 
their countries.461 Their appearance and conduct should not only reflect the values of their 
organization, but also the values of their state. They are always on duty in this regard, 
maintaining their personal discipline and professionalism as well as that of their units.462 
Professional NCOs communicate clearly and effectively, especially by making sure 
their subordinates understand what they are to accomplish and the reasons or intent behind 
commands and orders.463 Professional NCOs lead their subordinates fairly and 
consistently. Finally, NCOs are leaders and supervisors of junior enlisted troops and 
advisors to officers on enlisted matters.464 
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Professional education for NCOs focuses on the Marine Corps’ 14 leadership traits: 
judgment, justice, discipline, integrity, decisiveness, tact, initiative, enthusiasm, bearing, 
unselfishness, courage, knowledge, loyalty, and endurance. While all of these are 
important, the NCO will work to achieve mastery of judgement, justice, integrity, 
decisiveness, initiative, unselfishness, knowledge, and endurance. Senior leader seminars 
would seek to develop NCOs who understand commander’s intent and “execute disciplined 
initiative” within that intent.465  
The Military Intelligence Basic Officer Course-Africa (MIBOC-A) and the 
Military Intelligence Non-Commissioned Officer Course-Africa (MINOC-A) is a current 
program that seeks to build trust and communication between officers and NCOs of 
Cameroon, Chad, Tunisia, Senegal, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso through intelligence 
gathering, analysis, and planning exercises.466 The intelligence basic course training uses 
planning scenarios and divided students into integrated officer and NCO teams, some of 
which were led by NCOs. A Senegalese lieutenant attending the course admitted they 
normally do not incorporate their NCOs into planning and independent leadership.467 The 
result was a greater appreciation of the NCOs’ abilities to complete their tasks on their own 
initiative. The exercise improved trust and communication between officers and NCOs 
attending the course.  
Professionalizing African NCO corps complements the strategic objective to 
increase capacity to operate independently and improve interoperability with global and 
regional partners. The decentralized leadership the U.S. Marines want to impress upon 
African militaries requires officers and NCOs to trust and communicate with one 
another.468 Trust between officers and their NCOs and subordinates is much rarer in Africa 
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than in Western militaries.469 If NCOs are to become trusted advisors to commanders on 
enlisted matters and the health and proficiency of their units, then professional education 
specific to that end must be included in security cooperation.470  
B. ANALYSIS AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES 
The case studies on El Salvador and Colombia provide a good reference for 
analyzing how U.S. military training and professional education can effect civil-military 
relations in Cameroon and Senegal. This section will summarize and compare the cases to 
Cameroon and Senegal. It will also test the hypotheses and discuss the findings.     
Both the ESAF and COLAR primarily received military training with some 
professional education. Thousands of officers and enlisted trained at U.S. military bases 
and attended the School of the Americas. United States troops also trained with the ESAF 
and COLAR in their home countries and provided assistance during combat operations. 
Professional education included leadership training, ethics, human rights, and the rule of 
law. Cameroon and Senegal are receiving assistance that in many ways is similar to that 
provided to El Salvador and Columbia and how that assistance effected the latter informs 
how it could affect the former. 
El Salvador and Colombia achieved different levels of democratic civil-military 
relations after receiving U.S. military training and professional education. This was largely 
due to several factors effecting each state at the time of receiving assistance. These factors 
are the regime type, the type and level of civilian control of the military, institutionalized 
violence, the level of military professionalism, and the perceived nature of security threats. 
El Salvador’s state regime was an illiberal democracy that was ran by the military at times 
while Colombia’s rulers had been democratically elected since 1958. El Salvador had tight 
control of the military, which followed orders to attack not only insurgents but also 
peasants and Jesuit leadership. Colombia had control of the military, but its effectiveness 
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vacillated from strong to weak depending on how the military reacted to reforms and based 
on the battlefield success of Colombia’s disparate insurgencies at the time of those reforms. 
Violence was institutionalized from the Salvadoran regime through the lowest ranks of the 
ESAF and culminated in the creation of the Death Squads. The Colombian regime 
attempted military reforms over time that attempted to limit collateral damage and human 
rights violations, but the COLAR supported paramilitary groups that committed human 
rights violations. Both the ESAF and the COLAR were perceived as a means for social 
mobility instead of professional institutions that served the state and its citizens. Both also 
perceived their respective insurgencies as existential threats that justified the brutal 
methods they used to counter them. Ultimately, however, oversight mechanisms enforced 
by the U.S. Congress –including withholding funding of U.S. security assistance programs 
based on human rights violations—played a significant role in El Salvador and Colombia 
eventually achieving democratic civil-military relations. It forced reforms in the former 
and facilitated them in the latter.  
The factors that impacted the success of military training and professional 
education programs in El Salvador and Colombia can also be assessed in Cameroon and 
Senegal. Cameroon is an illiberal democracy, but not a military-based regime, and Senegal 
is a consolidated democracy. Both have strong civilian control of the military. However, 
Cameroon’s president uses the military to repress political opposition and violently 
suppress civilian protest. Senegal’s military has overtly refused to intervene in politics and 
accepts the supremacy of civilian control. Evidence suggests that neither state has 
institutionalized violence; however, Amnesty International’s reporting of Cameroon’s 
human rights violations surrounding their fight against Boko Haram is disturbing. While 
there are hundreds of reports of torture and allegations of state-sponsored murder in 
Cameroon, it is not comparable to the tens of thousands of disappearances and murders 
that occurred in El Salvador and Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s. Both the Cameroon 
and Senegalese armed forces are considered professional, especially in the soldiering skills 
model, but the Senegalese have also demonstrated solider-state professionalism in their 
refusal to support President Wade’s attempt to unconstitutionally retain control in 2012 
and their refusal to violently suppress civilian protests. Both militaries are also all volunteer 
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forces with strict recruitment policies and no evidence suggests they are considered 
primarily as a means of social mobility. Finally, neither state seems to view their security 
threats as existential, although the Boko Haram and Anglophone crises have potential to 
be viewed that way by Cameroon, and Senegal considered the Casamance insurgency as 
an existential threat during the 1990s.  
Initial research determined the available scholarly literature did not adequately 
address if externally provided training and education encouraged military transitions to 
democratic civilian control. This generated four possible effects on civil-military relations 
in Africa. Each hypothesis is tested by comparing and contrasting the above case studies. 
The findings follow. 
1. Professional Education and Training Will Result in Increased 
Military Effectiveness but Decreased Civilian Control  
This outcome is unlikely in Cameroon and Senegal. The case studies discussed in 
this thesis show that militaries receiving U.S. military training and professional education 
achieve short-term increases in soldiering skills professionalism. Tactics, techniques, and 
procedures improve, and it is reasonable to expect some increase in capabilities and the 
capacity to conduct operations independently. This most likely also causes a measurable 
uptick in lethality. Effectiveness is therefore increased if actions on the enemy are the 
primary measure of effectiveness. 
Transitioned militaries show strong soldier-state professionalism. They respect the 
rule of law, subscribe to the supremacy of civilian control, and are apolitical. The case 
studies show little improvement in soldier-state professionalism in the ESAF and the 
COLAR. Evidence shows the professional education provided to the ESAF and the 
COLAR included respect for the rule of law, human rights, and the supremacy of civilian 
control. Salvadoran and Colombian troops trained and worked closely with U.S. troops in 
the United States and in their home states. Yet socialization with U.S. soldiers and 
professional education failed to transfer the norms of American military professionalism –
the solder-state model—to the ESAF and the COLAR and these ideals were not 
institutionalized. The transition to democratic civil-military relations was largely 
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politically driven and not the result of U.S. military training and professional education. 
This does not imply that no Salvadoran and Colombian soldiers were socialized to the 
ideals of soldier-state professionalism, but evidence indicates that socialization did not 
become systematic within the military institution until the state regimes forced military 
reforms.   
Cameroon and Senegal will likely achieve increased military effectiveness in 
soldiering skills through military training and professional education. Senegal is likely to 
achieve higher soldier-state effectiveness due to the current state of their democratic civil-
military relations. Many soldier-state ideals are institutionalized, so socialization with U.S. 
soldiers would reinforce these norms. This would equate to fewer human rights violations 
in Casamance as well as increased institutionalization of the supremacy of civilian control 
under the rule of law. Cameroon could also see improvements in soldier-state 
professionalism but that increase would likely be significantly constrained due to the 
partisan nature of the Cameroon armed forces.   
Decreased civilian control is unlikely in both Cameroon and Senegal except under 
extreme situations. Cameroon soldiers who internalize respect for the rule of law and 
human rights could choose to shirk their duties when ordered to oppress political opponents 
and suppress civil protest. Shirking would constitute a loss of civilian control, although it 
is unlikely to be widespread. Senegal could experience decreased civilian control if 
significant democratic regression occurs and the military chooses to intervene, but the 2012 
case where the military chose not to help Wade retain office indicates the form of 
democratic regress would have to more extreme than mere constitutional amendment. 
Therefore, Senegal’s history of nonintervention makes this very unlikely, whereas shirking 
in Cameroon is slightly more likely as evidenced by limited media reports that Cameroon 
troops are fleeing with refugees to Nigeria. Civilian control of the military did decrease in 
Colombia at times during the period under review but not due to the training and 
professional education they received. Decreased civilian control occurred primarily when 
insurgents saw increased battlefield successes and the COLAR resisted reforms instituted 
by the state –most commonly reforms associated with human rights—in attempts to regain 
the advantage against the enemy. El Salvador’s civilian control of the armed forces was 
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heavily influenced by the military leadership, and therefore technically decreased. 
However, the decrease in civilian control was not due to the U.S. assistance the ESAF 
received. 
Military training and professional education is unlikely to cause an increase in 
military effectiveness and a decrease in civilian control in Africa. Militaries in consolidated 
democracies will likely achieve an increase in military effectiveness that includes both 
increases in soldiering skills and soldier-state professionalism. Militaries in illiberal 
democracies will likely achieve only modest increases in military effectiveness because 
increases in soldier-state professionalism will be limited. It is very unlikely that civilian 
control will decrease in either type of regime but it is not removed as a possibility. 
Militaries in either regime could mutiny or, in extreme cases, overthrow rulers based on an 
internalization of soldier-state model concepts that interpreted illiberal rule or democratic 
backsliding as a threat to the national interest or constitutional norms. However, the mood 
and opportunity to mutiny or conduct a coup must be present and the risk of failure low. 
This would decrease civilian control but also demonstrate deficient soldier-state 
professionalism due to the disrespect for the supremacy of civilian control.   
2. Professional Education and Training Will Result in Increased 
Military Effectiveness and Increased Civilian Control 
This outcome is possible for Cameroon and probable for Senegal. Both militaries 
are likely to achieve measurable increases in effectiveness. Cameroon has strong, but 
undemocratic civilian control, that is likely to continue due to increasing security threats 
by Boko Haram in the north and Anglophone separatists in the west, as noted in the 
previous chapter. It is possible that increased soldier-state professionalism provides 
avenues for the Cameroon armed forces to seek reform in the security sector that include 
increased oversight by the legislature to decrease corruption, but it is unlikely to achieve 
increased democratic civilian control while President Biya remains in office. Senegal, on 
the other hand, currently has democratic civil-military relations and U.S. military training 
and professional education is likely to deepen the military’s respect for the supremacy of 
civilian control. Democratically transitioned militaries protest through resignation, not 
through intervention, and this is the most likely outcome for Senegal unless the state 
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undergoes significant democratic regression that triggers a savior of the state type of 
response.471 Therefore, the likely impact in Africa is that illiberal democracies with strong 
civilian control and consolidated democracies both achieve increased military 
effectiveness and increased civilian control.  
3. Professional Education and Training Will Result in Decreased 
Military Effectiveness and Increased Civilian Control 
This result is unlikely in the cases of Cameroon and Senegal but could result in 
other African states. Increased military effectiveness should be measured by improvements 
in both soldering skills and soldier-state professionalism. The El Salvador and Colombia 
case studies demonstrate that U.S. military training and professional education can achieve 
improvements in soldiering skills and fail to achieve measurable improvements in soldier-
state professionalism. Restated, militaries may become more effective in achieving 
assigned missions, but this can coincide with an increase in human rights violations, 
partisanship, or political intervention. Decreased military effectiveness could also result if 
the training received was incompatible with the roles and missions assigned to the military. 
This could occur if U.S. military interests do not align with partner state military interests, 
yet the partner state accepts U.S. military aid regardless.  
Increased civilian control can be achieved even with decreased military 
effectiveness. However, this would not be directly caused by the military training and 
professional education. Increased civilian control can result in decreased military 
effectiveness if the civilian authority neuters the military through budget reductions or 
other punitive administrative controls, or if the partner state accepts military training and 
professional education but does not staff the bureaucracies that support the military.472 Yet, 
these outcomes of increased civilian control and decreased military effectiveness are not 
directly related to the assistance received. 
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4. Professional Education and Training Will Result in Decreased 
Military Effectiveness and Decreased Civilian Control  
This outcome is unlikely in Cameroon and Senegal, but may be possible in African 
states with weak civilian control of the military that struggle to fund and equip their 
militaries and pay their soldiers. These internal factors could prevent positive outcomes of 
U.S. military training and professional education. Some militaries receive erratic pay and 
junior enlisted seek supplemental income, some of which may be achieved through illegal 
activity.473 This form of shirking distracts or removes the soldier from the military’s roles 
and missions and decreases its effectiveness. In extreme cases, this may result in mutiny or 
political intervention that limits or eliminates civilian control. Like the previous 
hypotheses, this outcome is more related to internal state factors than the training and 
education received.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The potential effects of U.S. led military training and professional education on 
democratization of African civil-military relations is mixed and depends on several factors. 
These factors are regime type, the type and level of civilian control of the military, 
institutionalized violence, the level of military professionalism, and the perceived nature 
of security threats. It can lead to increased effectiveness and increased civilian control of 
the military, but this does not necessarily lead to democratic civil-military relations. Each 
of the factors above can influence the outcomes. In the case of Cameroon, it is very likely 
its armed forces will achieve increased soldiering skills and may even internalize some 
soldier-state professionalism, but the partisan and co-ethnic nature of the military, the 
nature of President Biya’s 34 year illiberal democratic rule, and the dual security threats of 
Anglophone separatist actions, and Boko Haram, are likely to prevent a transition to 
democratic civil-military relations. Biya cannot live forever, however, so there is potential 
that U.S. military training and professional education prepares the Cameroon armed forces 
for a democratic transition upon his death if his successor insists on reforms, the military 
has accepted the norms of rule of law, and reduced its prerogatives for partisanship. On the 
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contrary, U.S. military training and professional education will likely deepen democratic 
civil-military relations in the case of Senegal. It is also likely that democratic civil-military 
relations can become so deeply engrained in the Senegalese armed forces’ psyche that it 
can survive future attempts at democratic regress. 
However, sustaining positive change will require iterative training and professional 
education with donor state forces or the establishment of homegrown training and 
professional education programs or institutions in Cameroon and Senegal or any African 
state in which it takes place. This requires a state apparatus that is capable of supporting it, 
otherwise military training and professional education will just become another form of aid 
on which the partner state will become dependent. The conclusion will determine if the 
research questions were answered and provide recommendations to address concerns.  
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This thesis questioned if U.S. military training and professional education provided 
to African militaries could impair or improve democratic civil-military relations in Africa. 
The research demonstrates the characteristics of the partner state regime and military have 
a large influence on the outcome that may outweigh the impacts of the assistance they 
receive. Military and professional education programs can achieve measurable 
improvements in military effectiveness and civilian control of the military but are unlikely 
to result in democratic civil-military relations in all states.  
Through the case studies of the U.S. military training and professional education 
provided to El Salvador and Colombia during their counterinsurgencies of the 1980s and 
1990s, we discovered that military effectiveness increases if measured primarily through 
lethality or combat effectiveness. The ESAF and the COLAR became more effective in 
their ability to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy. However, both militaries also 
increased human rights violations. Also, neither state experienced greater civilian control 
as a direct result of the training and education. Military reforms and democratic civil-
military relations were achieved in El Salvador only after the United States threatened to 
cut off military aid. Colombia achieved it through a combination of endogenous 
government reforms and conditional U.S. aid. So far, Senegal has sustained a high level of 
military professionalism and democratic civil-military relations after years of receiving 
U.S. military aid. In comparison, Cameroon has also received many years of U.S. military 
assistance but human rights violations by the armed forces have reportedly increased as 
terrorism and insurgency have increased. Therefore, these facts demonstrate the 
unlikelihood that U.S. military training and professional education on its own can achieve 
democratic civil-military relations in a partner state.  
Consolidated democracies with apolitical, ethnically heterogenous militaries whose 
soldiers believe the military is a profession are most likely to achieve increased democratic 
civil-military relations while receiving only U.S. military training and professional 
education. This is representative of Senegal. Colombia was a consolidated democracy, but 
its military, while multi-ethnic, was less professional at the time it received assistance. 
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Illiberal democracies, like Cameroon, with strong, but undemocratic civilian control of the 
military and partisan, co-ethnic militaries are less likely to achieve democratic civil-
military relations through U.S. assistance that only includes military training and 
professional education. Military-dominated regimes like El Salvador in the 1980s are 
unlikely to achieve democratic civil-military relations through U.S. military training and 
professional education. Therein lies the challenge in Africa, including Cameroon, which is 
more representative of the continent’s states than Senegal. Can the United States achieve 
its national strategic objectives in Africa through primarily providing military training and 
professional education to African states? 
 The moral dilemma 
Achieving only an increase in military effectiveness along the soldiering skills 
model of professionalism might be acceptable if the United States is only concerned with 
defeating or mitigating the security threats of violent extremist organizations, piracy, 
narcotics trafficking, and human trafficking. Combat effective African militaries could 
successfully neutralize these threats with U.S. assistance, effectively preventing the ability 
of these threats to negatively impact the U.S. homeland or U.S. commercial interests in 
Africa. But this was part of the failure of security cooperation and security assistance in El 
Salvador and Colombia. Security assistance through 1991 served to support proxy wars 
against communism.474 Cold War rhetoric identified communism as an existential threat to 
the United States and its allies. This promoted the idea that the ends –defeating the 
socialists at all costs—justified the means. Dangers seemed to emerge everywhere for the 
United States during the Cold War, blurring the lines between war and peace and requiring 
the creation and training of larger professional militaries, for which the United States was 
willing to fund and equip.475 Plan Colombia served a similar role in the war on drugs. A 
similar result has occurred since the 11 September 2001 attacks and Africa has the potential 
to become a proxy battlefield in the War on Terror. 
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African military success against these security threats will be a pyrrhic victory for 
the United States and its African partners if it comes at the cost of increased human rights 
violations and poor governance. Political rhetoric promoting the War on Terror is very 
similar to the rhetoric of the Cold War: terrorism represents an existential threat to freedom 
and the American way of life. An “any means necessary” approach to security threats has 
a pragmatic appeal, but it can lead to morally questionable outcomes if the United States 
chooses to accept stable authoritarianism as an acceptable counter to security threats in 
Africa.476 The United States is conducting training and operations throughout much of 
Africa to combat these threats and spending considerable amounts of money. Military aid 
to defeat terrorism and narcotics far exceeds the aid provided to promote human rights.477 
The potential exists for some states to see counter-terrorism and other military operations 
as avenues to receiving increased U.S. aid that promotes regime security. Africa 
Command’s strategic objectives are to deepen democracy, increase military respect for the 
rule of law, and instill military professionalism because for decades the United States has 
seen these as keys to achieving security and stability. If the United States wants to achieve 
security and stability in Africa, U.S. engagement must involve more than security 
cooperation and security assistance. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Military training and professional education must be part of a greater security sector 
reform and democracy promotion program that incorporates multiple U.S. government 
agencies and nongovernmental agencies and targets the partner state’s whole of 
government. The strategy should incorporate civil society, engagement, partnership, and 
outreach.478 Security sector reform programs must be developed with an understanding of 
the partner state’s political, military, social, and historical context. Therefore, no two 
African programs are likely to be identical and some are likely to be more difficult to 
develop and require diplomatic finesse to incorporate.   
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Partner state oversight mechanisms --checks and balances-- and accountability for 
military and political leaders are required and should be a top priority.479 This requires 
significant coordination from the DoS, DoD, and legislative think tanks to develop 
academic programs that can be tailored to each partner state and executed within the 
constraints of their politics system. Programs would include legislative armed services 
committees, budgeting, diplomacy, and national strategy development. 
Military reforms that include merit-based promotion, ethnically diverse 
recruitment, and professionalism are needed in Africa.480 Roles and missions must be 
defined, as well as military’s responsibility to the state and citizens, and emphasis on 
respecting the rule of law and constitutionalism.481 In order to achieve military reforms, 
defense ministries must also be reformed and professionalized. They must have the 
technical skills to manage the military. 
The United States must also provide adequate oversight of these programs to ensure 
their legitimacy and success. Measures of military effectiveness need to be established for 
each partner state along the lines of both soldiering skill and soldier-state professionalism. 
These could identify shirking duties in combat, coups, human rights abuses, mutiny, 
looting, corruption, and crime as examples of unprofessionalism.482 Strict adherence to the 
Leahy amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act must occur. States, units, and personnel 
accused of human rights violations and corruption should be removed from assistance 
programs for the minimum durations required by U.S. statute and until designated 
authorities determine they are compliant. The Congress should further constrain the 
Executive Branch’s power to override the Leahy Act through designation as a national 
security crisis, as happened on multiple occasions in the years of support to El Salvador 
and Colombia. Human rights violations by Cameroon in the fight against Boko Haram 
reflect those of El Salvador against the FMLN or Colombia against the FARC, albeit on a 
smaller scale.    
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Context driven programs developed for each partner state will take time and drive 
up costs initially due to a likely need for additional manpower requirements in the agencies 
charged with creating the programs. However, this will eventually balance out because 
some states will need fewer aspects of security sector reforms than others. Senegal, for 
example, is likely to deepen its democratic civil-military relations through military training 
and professional education alone. While Cameroon’s program may require more aspects 
of security sector reform, the United States may be heavily constrained in implementing it 
due to Cameroon’s politics, thereby reducing execution costs. Partner state context and 
U.S. national interest will drive development and implementation.     
B. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
The scholarship on African civil-military relations appears to be limited to those 
states with significant coup histories. Research should be expanded to include those states 
that have stable civil-military relations, like Senegal and Cameroon, to better understand 
why their civil-military relations are stable, if not always democratic. The fact that both 
Cameroon and Senegal were former French colonies but developed different regime types 
and civil-military relations suggests another avenue of research: does the colonial master 
impact state regime and type of civil-military relations after independence and why? 
Scholarship also seems to be limited on the specific effects of U.S. military training on 
African militaries. El Salvador and Colombia were picked as case studies because of their 
notoriety. Volumes of material exists detailing the types of U.S. military training and 
professional education provided to both states and the outcomes. More research into the 
effects on Africa should occur, including how training and education impacts African 
military effectiveness against VEOs.   
C. TIME WILL TELL 
Professionalizing militaries in African states is not a one size fits all proposition. 
Training and professional education is likely to achieve both professionalization and 
democratic civil-military relations only under the right circumstances. It is important to 
remember that Western powers had just transitioned to the modern definition of democratic 
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civilian control around the time of African decolonization.483 This slow transition by 
Western states should help manage expectations for African states who came to 
independence via disparate methods and only within the last 60 years. African states 
receiving U.S. assistance today will not transition tomorrow. It may take decades to see the 
wholesale positive transition to democratic civil-military relations in Africa, especially if 
U.S. assistance focuses primarily on military training and professional education.  
  
                                                 
483 Bachmann, 611. 
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